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I. Introduction
Switzerland has claimed to be a neutral state since the
beginning of the sixteenth century.' With the adoption of the
Swiss Federal Constitution in 1848, it became internationally
recognized that Switzerland would steer away from foreign
entanglements. 2
In the last few centuries, Switzerland has
successfully maintained this position. The Swiss did not enter into
either World War (WWI and WWII); they are not part of the
European Union (EU), and they did not become a member of the
United Nations (UN) until 2002.' Non-entanglement has defined
the Swiss identity as a state and legal entity and has allowed
Switzerland to prosper economically by avoiding war and creating
a stable banking system.4
Despite this successful history of neutrality, Switzerland's
quest for absolute sovereignty has become increasingly difficult
during the age of globalization.' The August 19, 2009 agreement
I See Gordon E. Sherman, The Neutrality of Switzerland, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 241,
241-50 (1918) ("We may, perhaps, assign a beginning to Switzerland's neutral existence
by dating it from the permanent peace between Switzerland and France concluded at
Freiburg, November 12, 1516, since from this date Switzerland, considered as a
homogeneous federal alliance, did not again take any direct part in warlike
activities . . . ."); see also infra notes 162-222 and accompanying text (discussing the
history of Swiss neutrality).
2 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE Swiss CONFEDERATION:

SEPTEMBER 12,

1848 WITH ART. XLI AND XLVIII AS AMENDED JANUARY 14, 1866 (Berne trans., 2d ed.

2010).
3 See Swiss Vote Narrowly to Join U.N., CNN WORLD (Mar. 3, 2002),
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-03/world/swiss.resultI swiss-vote-cantons-swissconstitution? s=PM:WORLD (discussing Switzerland joining the U.N.); see also LEO
SCHELBERT, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF SWITZERLAND 105 (2007) (explaining
Switzerland's rationale for not joining the EU); HUGH R. WILSON, SWITZERLAND:
NEUTRALITY AS A FOREIGN POLICY 9-13 (1974) (discussing Switzerland's reaction to and

policy regarding the world wars).
4 See Chuck Saletta, Switzerland: It's Not Just for Banks Anymore,
DAILYFINANCE (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/10/21/switzerlandits-not-just-for-banks-anymore (discussing Switzerland's economic stability); see
generally WILSON, supra note 3 (discussing Switzerland's history of neutrality).
5 See Alston & Bird LLP, IRS Announces Settlement Agreement Between
Switzerland and the US. (IR-2009-75), INT'L TAX ADVISORY, Sept. 15, 2009, passim
(discussing the agreement between Switzerland and the United States through which
Switzerland must provide names of U.S. taxpayers with accounts in the United Bank of
Switzerland to the United States).
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between the United States and Switzerland to release the names of
approximately 4450 U.S. account holders has permanently altered
the Swiss privacy policy. 6 Recently, Switzerland has been
proactive in freezing the accounts of alleged human rights
violators. On January 19, 2011, Switzerland froze assets of
Ivorian leader, Laurent Gbagbo.'
On February 24, 2011,
"Switzerland froze the assets of [Muammar] Qaddafi and his
entourage for three years in order to avoid possible
'misappropriation' of these funds."'
Similarly, the Swiss
authorities froze assets held by former Tunisian president Zine El
Abidine Beb Ali and former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
and his immediate circle.' These events marked a clear break with
Switzerland's past, when the names of account holders and their
assets were strictly guarded.
This article seeks to understand why Switzerland changed its
bank secrecy laws. Were the changes in Swiss banking practices
the result of adaptation to the changes made within the banking
environment since 2001? Or did the international system apply a
form of checks and balanceso on Swiss sovereignty, thus
6 See id (discussing the components and requirements of the 2009 Agreement).
7 Switzerland Freezes Assets of Ivorian Leader Gbagbo, BBC NEWS (Jan. 19,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12229788.
8 Jennifer M. Freedman & Leigh Baldwin, Switzerland Freezes Assets of Qaddafi,
Regime
Officials for Three
Years,
BLOOMBERG
(Feb.
24,
2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-24/switzerland-freezes-assets-of-qaddafiregime-officials-for-three-years.html (explaining that this was the "first time Switzerland
[froze] the assets of a leader who is still in power").
9 See id; see also Swiss Freeze Gaddafi, Mubarak and Ben Ali Assets, FRANCE 24
(Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.france24.com/en/20110502-switzerland-freezes-400-millionassets-tied-qaddafi-stashed-mubarak-ben-ali?%20nslinkname=20110502_switzerland
freezes 400 million assets tied&nscampaign=editorial&ns mchannel=reseaux socia
ux&ns source-twitter&ns fee=0&quicktabs 1=1; Switzerland Freezes Assets of 31
Former Regime

Figures, EGYPT

INDEP.

(Sept.

25,

2012),

http://www.egypt

independent.com/news/switzerland-freezes-assets-3 1-former-regime-figures.
10 This article will use the term "checks and balances" to describe a system of
states that use the power of treaties (legislative means), international organizations
(administrative means), and courts (judicial means) to modify state behavior. In other
words, as used in this article, the three elements of the classical definition of checks and
balances are not creating an equilibrium between each other (as in the context of
separation of powers), but are instead used in concert to create equilibrium within the
international system of states.
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pressuring it to amend its laws? If so, how does this form of
checks and balances function in the international system of states?
To answer these questions, this article discusses three major
events that led to the August 2009 agreement. First, there was
intense international pressure for transparency in light of 9/11 and
the 2008 financial crisis. Specifically, the market crash in October
2008 created a pressing need for the United States to tax the
offshore assets of its citizens and instigate an accelerated
government crack-down on tax-dodging schemes." This hunt for
offshore assets was also preceded by the "Global War on
Terror," 2 which required that intelligence agencies and banks
share information on possible accounts used to fund terror cells,
increase financial transparency, and monitor transactions in the
wake of 9/11. "
Second, Swiss banking secrecy has long been considered
unethical because it has protected ruthless dictators and
criminals.14 A growing sense of morality in the international
community has created an environment where states such as
Switzerland have frozen or confiscated assets held by dictators and
human rights abusers."

11 See Mark Scott, Tax Haven Crackdown Creates Opportunities for Bankers,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/crackdown-on-taxhavens-opens-opportunities-for-bankers/ (discussing the collaborative effort between
countries to share information on offshore banking after the 2008 financial crisis).
12 See "Global War on Terror" is Given a New Name, WASH. POST (March
25,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR20090
32402818.html (discussing the Obama Administration's distancing itself from the phrase
"global war on terror," a signature rhetorical legacy of the Bush Administration).
13 See Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, The Threat of TerroristFinancing: Hearing on
Terrorism: Growing Wahhabi Influence in the United States Before the S. Comm. On
Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, 108th Cong. (June 26, 2003) (statement
of David D. Authauser, Gen. Counsel, Dept. of the Treas.), available at
http://www.au.afmil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/terroristfinancing.htm; see
also
EMBASSY OF Swlrz., U.S. TESTIMONIALS ON Swiss LEADERSHIP IN COMBATING MONEY
LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2006), available at http://web.
archive.org/web/20060526111045/http://www.swissemb.org/legal/USTestSwiLead.pdf.
14 See infra notes 341-345 and accompanying text (explaining the historical
relationship between dictators and Swiss banking).
15 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (providing examples of recent
leaders whose accounts have been frozen).
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Finally, threats of criminal prosecution for tax evasion
perpetrated by a major Swiss bank doing business in the United
States was the ultimate step that brought about the August 2009
agreement. By examining these events in concert, this Article
seeks to understand first whether the Swiss decision to curtail its
bank secrecy laws was an organic response to the changing
international landscape or the result of pressure applied from other
states and, second, whether the international system of states can
apply a form of checks and balances to states that abuse their
sovereign powers.
II. The Significance of State Sovereignty
International systems exist in a state of anarchy; there is no
However, within this
hierarchy of legitimate authority.' 6
anarchical system are recognized rules and institutions." The
contemporary international system is based on the understanding
that sovereign states interact through shared interests and common
values.' These fundamental actors of the modern state system are
"territorial units with judicial independence," not dejure subject to
external authority.19 Although their options can be somewhat
constrained by the "power and preference of foreign actors," states
have reasonable control over their territory and the subjects within
them.20
With the rise of globalization and new human rights norms,
encountered
sovereignty
has
however,
modern
state
"unprecedented pressures." 2 1 Arjun Appadurai argues that modern
state sovereignty is "on its last legs,"22 because wars, immigration,
16 Stephen Krasner, Abiding Sovereignty, 22 INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 229, 231 (2001)
(stating that anarchy is the defining trait of international systems).
17

See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN

WORLD POLITICS (1977) (discussing international relations with a focus on cooperation
and exchange between states).
18 See id at 16 ("A society ofstates (or international society) exists when a group
of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in
the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules ....
19 Krasner, supra note 16, at 229-51.
20 Id. at 230.
21

Id

22

ARjUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE 19 (1996).
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inflation, and flights of capital threaten its existence.23 According
to Jessica Mathews, modem state sovereignty could be replaced
with a neo-medieval system of overlapping structures of
authority.24
In contemporary terms, sovereignty has been defined in four
distinct ways. First, "interdependence sovereignty" has been
characterized as "the ability of states to control movement within
their borders."2 5 Arguably, such control has diminished over time
because of the Internet, cross border movements, and international
capital flows.2 6 Thus, given the interconnectedness of issues in
today's global technological age, Switzerland might pay a higher
price for its unilateral policies. Second, "domestic sovereignty"
refers to domestic structures of the state and their ability to
function effectively.27 For this particular form of sovereignty to
exist, all members of the polity must acknowledge the structures
as legitimate.2 Legitimacy and effectiveness do not necessarily
overlap, as in the case of failed states, but in most well-ordered
domestic polities, both elements will be present.2 9 The third
category is "Westphalian" or "Vattelian" sovereignty, which
"refers to the exclusion of external sources of authority both de
jure and de facto."30 Under this form of sovereignty, the state is
the ultimate authoritative decision-making body at the exclusion of
all other actors.3' This principle of non-intervention into the
internal affairs of others was established after the Peace of

Id.
Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 61 (1997).
25 Krasner, supra note 16, at 231.
26 See id (arguing that globalization and technological advances have caused a
weakening of state sovereignty).
27 Id.
28 See id. at 232 (identifying acceptance as one requirement of domestic
sovereignty); see also J. BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE Six BOOKS
OF THE COMMONWEALTH 13-14 (J.H. Franklin ed. and trans. 1992); F. H. HINSLEY,
SOVEREIGNTY 181-84 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing other theorists' reactions to Bodin's
views); QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, VOL. 2:
THE AGE OF REFORMATION 284-87 (1978) (discussing Bodin's theory of absolutism).
29 See Krasner,supra note 16, at 232.
30 Id.
31 See id
23

24
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Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648.32 This
treaty "endorsed the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (the
prince sets the religion in his territory) originally formulated in the
Peace of Augsburg (1555)."33 The Wesphalian sovereignty thus
sets forth the principle of non-interventionism in other state's
affairs.34 The fourth category refers to "international legal
Under
sovereignty," which is based on mutual recognition."
to
accorded
is
international legal sovereignty, "recognition
juridically independent territorial entities which are capable of
entering into voluntary contractual agreements." 3 States must not
be coerced into agreements; there must be diplomatic immunity,
and the act of state doctrine, which prevents state actions from
being challenged in foreign courts, must be respected.3 7
Sovereignty is composed of both rules and practices, and these
four categories of sovereignty are not necessarily linked." In this
age of globalization and human rights norms, sovereignty is
challenged because states do not have absolute control over their
policies or laws.3 9 In his Economics of Interdependence, Richard
Cooper maintains that capital mobility is undermining the ability
of the state to control domestic monetary policy. 4 0
Communication has "transcend[ed] the territorial concept, and the
notion of each country having territorial control over electronic
communications." 4' Issues such as pollution, the drug trade,

32

See id

33

35

Id.
See id
Krasner, supra note 16, at 233.

36

Id.

34

See id ("International legal sovereignty is consistent with any agreement
provided that the state is not coerced.").
38 See id.
39 See id at 234 ("Many recent observers have argued that the sovereign-state
system is now under unprecedented stress because of two developments: globalization
and changing international norms with respect to human rights.").
40 See RICHARD COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERDEPENDENCE 4-6 (1968)
("[International economic intercourse] confines their freedom by embedding each
country in a matrix of constraints which it can influence only slightly, often only
indirectly and without certainty of effect.").
41 Eli M. Noam, The Public Telecommunications Network: A Concept in
37
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currency crises, and terrorism are transnational in nature and
cannot be dealt within a domestic context alone.42
Arguably, the concept of absolute sovereignty is a myth.43
Throughout history, states have acted in an interdependent
environment.4 4 Although interdependence has varied depending
on the kind of state and period in history, states have not "been
able to perfectly regulate transborder flows." 45
With the
establishment of the Wesphalian system, states were slow to create
a sophisticated system of tax collection.4 6 Indeed, they relied on
international borrowing to finance their activities, "the most
important of which was war." 47 It was only in the nineteenth
century that states developed efficient revenue collection
agencies.4 8 Stephen Krasner argues that globalization has not
necessarily undermined state activity, but rather the two have
grown "hand in hand."4 9 With the rise of technology and
sophisticated state apparatuses, the state is able to better control
some aspects of its polity, such as disease and order."o
International norms on human rights, however, have impacted
Westphalian sovereignty and states' "right to regulate relations

Transition, 37 J.COMM. 30, 44 (1987).
42 See JAMES ROSENAU, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE

AND CONTINUITY 130 (1990); see also Krasner, supra note 16, at 234.

43 See Krasner, supra note 16, at 234 (arguing that states have always operated
interdependently and will continue to do so in the face of contemporary, trans-boundary
issues such as terrorism and global epidemics).
44 See id. at 234 (explaining how states have always operated in an interdependent
manner).
45

Id.

46 See id. at 240-41 (attributing the eventual success of the modem European state
system to an improved economic system).
47 Id. at 234.
48

See CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 99-1990

53 (B. Blackwell ed., 1990) (providing a brief history of changes in "state control of
capital and of coercion between AD 900 and the present"); see also Krasner,supra note
16, at 234 (noting that some European states began tax collection systems in the
nineteenth century).
49 Krasner, supra note 16, at 236.
50 See generally Geoffrey Garrett, Global Market and National Politics: Collision
Course of Virtuous Cycle?, 52 INT'L ORG. 787 (1998) (arguing that, as of yet,
globalization has not caused a "race to the bottom").
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between [their] subjects and their rulers free of external
Under conventional notions of Wesphalian
interference.""
sovereignty, the state has ultimate control over the relations
between the rulers and the polity.5 2 "Policies emanating from
domestic political structures are not subject to challenge by
external actors, especially external actors claiming authority in
their own right."S3 International norms and regimes establish
standards that must be respected by all states.54 "The state might
be the only actor that can establish authoritative rules within its
own borders, but universal human rights norms imply that it
cannot set any rule that it pleases.""
However, "large and
powerful" states such as the United States and, until very recently,
Switzerland, "have been very successful at maintaining all
It has been more difficult for
elements of their sovereignty."
smaller and less powerful countries to succeed in the same way."
Moreover, new institutions such as the EU have changed the
conventional sovereignty of Europe itself." "The basic rule of
recognizing
juridically
legal
sovereignty,
international
independent territorial entities, no longer applies in Europe. The
EU has curtailed the Wesphalian/Vatellian sovereignty of its
members and altered the structure of their domestic political
institutions."5 9
III. The Law and Economics of State Sovereignty
In the past few decades, some states have passed legislation
providing individuals and corporations with anonymity and
protection from their home governments.60 By creating tax havens
51 Krasner, supra note 16, at 237.
52 See id. at 232.
53 Id. at 237.
54 See id.
55

Id.

56 Id. at 239.

57 See Krasner, supra note 16, at 231.
58 See id. at 244-45.
59 Id. at 245.
60 See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty,

56 INT'L. ORG. 151, 151 (2002) [hereinafter Palan, Tax Havens] (identifying these
characteristics as distinguishing factors of tax havens).
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for international actors, states have commercialized their
sovereignty.6
Ronen Palan argues that state havens are involved in the
"continuing process of state formation in a period of intensified
capital mobility."62 He argues that the commercialization of state
sovereignty originates from two contradicting trends. 63 First, the
process of shielding the state in law, which started in the sixteenth
century and climaxed in the nineteenth century, has started to
reverse itself.'
Second, the integration of world markets, or
globalization, which began with the development of multinational
corporations in the late 1800s, is on the rise.65
These two contradictory trends create a paradoxical situation
where the acceleration of capital mobility and integration of world
markets have been "accompanied not by any loosening of the
juridical unity of the state but by, if anything, the strengthening of
it."66
The friction between these two trends, that is, the
"increasing insulation of the state in law and the
internationalization of capital," required states to come up with
creative solutions, including "the development of the tax haven
and the commercialization of sovereignty."67 Palan argues that the
"commercialization of state sovereignty is endemic to a system
characterized by increasing economic integration within the
context of political fragmentation." 68 To better understand this
point, this article analyzes both the rise of tax havens and states'
capitalizing on national sovereignty.
A. The Rise of Tax Havens
"The complexity of modern national taxation systems,
combined with greater capital mobility, has rendered practically

See id. at 152.
Id at 153.
63 See id. (identifying the two trends as "the continuing process of insulating the
state in law" and "the rowing integration of the world market").
6 Id
65 Id.
66 Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 153.
67 Id
68 Id at 154.
61

62
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every country in the world a potential haven from some type of
taxation and regulation for residents of other countries."
Because the potential for escaping taxes and/or regulations from
the home country by using the laws of another is quite high, a
clear definition of tax haven is important.70 Some analysts suggest
the term "tax haven" should apply only to those states that
Another school of
explicitly promote themselves as such."
thought takes a broader view, defining tax havens as "countries
that have enacted tax legislation especially designed to attract the
formation of branches and subsidiaries of parent companies based
in heavily taxed industrial nations."72 The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines tax
havens as states that have: "(1) no or nominal tax on relevant
income; (2) [1]ack of effective exchange information; (3) [1]ack of
transparency; [and] (4). [n]o substantial activities." However,
most scholars and policy makers agree that tax havens develop as
a result of deliberate polices in states that seek to attract
international trade by minimizing taxes and reducing business
regulations.74
Tax havens share a substantial number of common traits.
First, these states tend to enact strong bank secrecy laws that
prohibit bank or state agents from disclosing identifying
information about account holders." Second, tax havens have
minimal or no personal or corporation tax.
Third, these states
69

Id

70 Id. (stating that the rise in popularity of tax havens has created some confusion
about the actual definition of a "tax haven").
71 See, e.g., ANTHONY S. GINSBERG, TAX HAVENS 1 (1991).
72 Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 154 (quoting RICHARD ANTHONY JOHNS &
C.M. LE MARCHANT, FINANCE CENTRES: BRITISH ISLE OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT SINCE
1979 (1993); ADAM STARCHILD, TAX HAVENS FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

1 (1994);

Sheldon 1. Banoff & Burton W. Kanter, States Compete to Save Taxes Owed to Other
States, 80 J.TAX'N 382 (1994)).
73 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION:
SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE PROJECT 11 (2009), available at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/13/42469606.pdf.
74 See, e.g., RICHARD ANTHONY JOHNS, TAx HAVENS AND OFFSHORE FINANCE: A

STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 20 (1983).
75 See Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 155.
76 Id
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have few regulations on financial transactions and limit
restrictions on business activities." Most importantly, tax havens
have enacted laws that protect the secrecy of business
transactions. 78
Palan argues that the more successful tax havens also share
another set of characteristics that make them attractive to foreign
companies and individuals. 79 He maintains that "successful tax
haven[]" states also "possess political and economic stability.""
These successful havens "are supported by a large international
financial market or are equipped with sophisticated informationexchange facilities and are within easy reach of a major financial
center.""1 Usually, these states "have agreements with major
[industrialized states] in order to avoid double taxation and
regulation."8 2 Importantly, successful tax havens "are not tainted
by scandals, money laundering, or drug money.",83
Palan identifies "four classes of tax havens":84
1. countries with no income tax and where foreign corporations
pay only license fees (examples are Anguilla, the Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Djibouti,
Turks and Caicos, and Vanuatu);
2. countries with low taxation (examples are Liechtenstein,
Oman, Switzerland, Jersey, Guernsey, and the British Virgin
Islands);
3. countries that levy taxes only on internal taxable events.
Profits from foreign sources are either not taxed or taxed at very
low rates (examples are Liberia, Panama, Philippines,
Venezuela, and Hong Kong);
4. countries that grant special tax privileges to certain types of

77 See id.
78 See id.
79

Id. at 155-56.

80

Id.

81

Palan, Tax Havens, supranote 60, at 155-56.

82

Id

83 Id.
84 Id. at 154 (citing Y. S. Park, The Economics of Offshore FinancialCenters, 17
COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 31, 33, 34 tbl.1 (1982) (describing "four different types of

offshore centers")).
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companies or operations (examples are the Channel Islands,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Isle of Man, Monaco, the
Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, Austria, and Singapore).ss
Other states, such as the Philippines, Jordan, Greece, and
Tunisia have enacted "specific legislation for regional offices of
foreign companies."8' Regardless, however, of their classification
or the extent tax havens provide incentives for foreign corporation
and individuals, their combined effect on the global economy is
quite significant. One study, by Global Financial Integrity, shows
that "poor countries 'lose' more than $1 trillion a year to tax
havens, around ten times the aid they receive."87 The study claims
that most of this money is not taxed because it is "illegally
generated or transferred" to richer states.88 Another study by
Global Financial Integrity "found that the average tax revenue loss
to all developing countries was between $98 billion and $106
billion annually during the years 2002 through 2006."" This
equates to "about 4.4 percent of the entire developing world's
government revenue."9 0 Oxfam claims that "at least $6.2 trillion
of developing country wealth is held offshore ... depriving
developing countries of annual tax receipts of between $64124bn."" The Tax Justice Network says that around $11.5 trillion
of private wealth is held in global offshore deposits. 9 2 A study by
ActionAid shows that companies in the FTSE 100 index had 8492
Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 155.
87 Trouble Island: Public Anger and Shareholder Unease Threaten Tax Haven's
Tranquility, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 2011, at 68 [hereinafter Trouble Island]; see also DEV
85

86

KAR & KARLY CURCIO, ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 2000-

2009: UPDATE WITH A Focus ON ASIA i, vii (2011), available at http://www.gf
integrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/IFF2010/gfi iff updatereport-web.pdf.
88

KAR & CURCIO, supra note 87, at i.

89

ANN HOLLINGSHEAD, THE IMPLIED TAX REVENUE LOSS FROM TRADE MISPRICING

2 (2010), available at http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/
implied%20tax%20revenue%20oss%20report final.pdf.
90 Id
91 Tax Haven Crackdown Could Deliver $120bn a Year to Fight Poverty - Oxfam,
OXFAM, para. 2 (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.oxfam.org.nz/node/3378.
92 See Magnitudes: Dirty Money, Lost Taxes and Offshore, TAX JUST. NETWORK,
para. 5, http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/frontcontent.php?idcat-103 (last visited Jan. 13,
2013) (discussing this study).
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subsidiaries "located in tax havens." 93 The study claims that "[o]f
the 100 biggest groups listed on the London Stock Exchange, 98
use tax havens."94 Although these studies can only approximate to
the real picture due to the difficulty of accessing this kind of
information, all data show that the tax haven phenomenon is a
growing concern for both the developed and developing world.95
The general consensus is that "the rise of tax havens [is due] to
the tremendous increase in state regulation and taxation."9 6 The
heavier the regulations and taxation, the more incentives
corporations and individuals have to use offshore services.97 The
Financial Stability Forum explains:
The main contributing factor identified for the historical growth
of offshore banking and [offshore financial centers] was the
imposition of increased regulation (reserve requirements,
interest rate ceilings, restrictions on the range of financial
products, capital controls, financial disclosure requirements,
high effective tax rates) in the financial sectors of industrial
countries during the 1960s and 1970s.98
This study maintains that a number of small states began to offer a
few or no regulations in order to attract business to their territory.
In other words, tax havens generate income by creating a
permissive regulatory environment, thus attracting foreign
companies and "earning a rent from their sovereign status."99 The
differences between regulations and taxations in different states
"can lead to perverse competition in regulatory laxity and a
gravitation by some institutions to the least regulated financial
centers."' 00
Other scholars maintain "that tax havens evolve as deliberate

93 ACTIONAID, ADDICTED TO TAX HAVENS: THE SECRET LIFE OF THE FTSE 100. at 1
(2011), available at http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc lib/addictedtotax_havens.pdf.

94 Id.

95 See e.g., id. at 7 (discussing this particular study's limitations and difficulties).
96 Palan, Tax Havens, supranote 60, at 156.
97 See id. (explaining this relationship).
98

FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON OFFSHORE CENTRES

8 (2000), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0004b.pdf.
99 Trouble Island, supra note 87, at 69.
100 JOHNS, supra note 74, at 6.
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According to Palan,

"[a] study commissioned by the French Parliament demonstrates
convincingly that both Liechtenstein and Monaco have
persistently and knowingly sought to attract hot if not criminal
money."IO2 In 2002, both Monaco and Liechtenstein were put on
the OECD's "List of Unco-operative [sic] Tax Havens."'o3 Tom
Naylor documents how "lawyers and financiers associated with
the infamous Mafia boss Meir Lansky played a key role in drafting
the financial legislation of some of the best-known Caribbean tax
havens."' 0 4 According to the theories of Naylor and the French
Parliament, states that enact legislation to specifically attract
money from doubtful sources are "abusing the [international]
system of [states and their] sovereignty in order to advance [their
immediate] interests."10 5
In contrast to these accounts, Palan suggests that while "the
fledgling offshore economy was never accepted with great
enthusiasm by the advanced industrialized states," it is possible
that they encouraged tax havens, albeit for a completely different
set of reasons.' 6 Specifically, he argues that
the British dependencies in islands surrounding the United
Kingdom and in the Caribbean and the Pacific were actively
encouraged by the British state to develop their offshore
economy as a way of reducing dependency on mainland.
Similarly, the Dutch Antilles was developed by the Dutch state.
The United States has encouraged, indirectly, the formation of
101 Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 157.
102 Id (citing ARNAUD MONTEBOURG, PAR LA MISSION D'INFORMATION COMMUNE:
SUR LES OBSTACLES Au CONTROLE ET A LA REPRESSION DE LA DELINQUANCE
FINANCIERE ET Du BLANCHIMENT DES CAPITAUX EN EUROPE (2000), available at
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/rap-info/i2311-51 .asp#P1089_155970 (in French)).

103 See List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, OECD, para. 2, http://www.oecd.org/
document/57/0,3746,en_2649_33745_30578809_1_1 l_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 13,
2013) (stating that these countries made the list for a lack of "commitments to
transparency and exchange of information"). Both Liechtenstein and Monaco were
removed from this list in 2009. Id. para. 3.
104 Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 157 (citing R. THOMAS NAYLOR, HOT
MONEY AND THE POLITICS OF DEBT (1st ed. 1987)).
105 Id
106 RONEN PALAN, THE OFFSHORE WORLD: SOVEREIGN MARKETS, VIRTUAL PLACES,
AND NOMAD MILLIONAIRES xii (2006) [hereinafter PALAN, OFFSHORE WORLD].
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the Liberian and the Marshall Islands flags of convenience.107
He further argues that it was not until the 1990s that the
international community realized tax havens were becoming a
problem for all industrialized states and started a "campaign
against" offshore economy.' 8
The first clear indication that the tax havens were no longer
accepted as a legitimate way of doing business "was the
publication of a 1998 OECD report titled Harmful Tax
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue."l0 9 The report was
"[a]ccepted by all OECD members except Switzerland and
Luxembourg."" 0 The report criticized "harmful tax practices in
the form of tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes in
OECD Member countries and non-Member countries and their
dependencies.""' A subsequent report has similarly "identified 47
preferential tax regimes in 9 categories as potentially harmful."ll 2
These studies implicitly acknowledge that states have the
ability to commercialize their sovereignty. Daniel W. Drezner
notes that "many small countries voluntarily auction off their
sovereignty to the highest bidder, reaping great rewards in the
process. In some respects, it has never been so profitable to be a
nation-state than in this non-nation-state world."I' He goes on to
argue that the idea of "treating sovereignty as a commodity" is
nothing new.1 4 For example, "[i]n the 18th century, Great Britain
bribed Saxony in order to buy the Saxon vote for a British
electoral scheme in the Holy Roman Empire.""' More recently,
107

Id

108 See id. at xii-xiv (noting the change in atmosphere, particularly among various
international organizations).
109 Id. at xii (referring to ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) [hereinafter O.E.C.D., HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION]).

110

Id. at xii.

'I

O.E.C.D., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 109, at 3.

112

PALAN, OFFSHORE WORLD, supra note 106, at xii-xiii (mentioning additional

reports on the subject as well).
113 Daniel W. Drezner, Sovereignty for Sale, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at
76, 76.
114

Id.

115

Id.
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"during the Cold War, Third World rulers were not shy about
trading various aspects of their sovereignty, in the form of basing
[sic] rights or UN votes, usually in exchange for superpower
protection or . .. aid."" 6 Today, this commercialization has
morphed into a competition between tax haven states to "enable
companies to pay just the right amount of tax needed in any given
situation to side-step [Controlled Foreign Companies] rules."' '7
This is a disturbing race because it is "one not of diligence but
of laxity.""'

Robert Aliber notes that "states . . . use their

legislative capacities as 'baits' to attract business into their
jurisdictions.""19 In discussing selling sovereignty services in
exchange for income, Palan argues that although "[s]uch ...
arrangements ...
are perfectly legal ...
they are deeply
20
disturbing."I
States and individuals or corporations "handle
highly charged normative issues, such as citizenship and
nationality, in purely utilitarian terms. The willful misuse of ideas
and practices that go to the heart of the legitimacy of the modem
state as a 'national' state is the most disturbing aspect of the tax
haven phenomenon." 2 '
Others, such as Charles Tiebout and Gary Hufbauer, argue that
"these sorts of 'arrangements"' are part of an "efficiency
paradigm."' 22 In discussing competitive incorporation regulations
in the United States, Tiebout notes that "different jurisdictions
provide individuals and firms with a bundle of public services and
tax regulations."' 23 He postulates that by people moving to
"jurisdictions that offer desirable bundles of regulations," the
116

Id.

117

UK

Clamps

Down

on

Gibraltar

Tax-Escape

Companies,

PANORAMA,

http://www.panorama.gi/archive/001211/businessl.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
118 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(explaining that "[t]he states joined in advertising their wares," meaning they shopped
their relaxed laws to companies and individuals).
119 Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 158 (quoting ROBERT Z. ALIBER, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME 182 (Basic Books 2d and expanded ed. 1976)).
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. (referring to Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956)).
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"municipal jurisdictions . . . are compelled to compete with each

other by offering the kind of regulations that the market wants."' 24
He disagrees with "the 'laxity races' noted by Judge Brandeis"
because he feels this kind of competition "is likely to bring about
optimal public service as taxpayers adapt to the economic system"
in place.125 Hufbauer adds to this discussion by highlighting that
"competition between [different jurisdictions] does not necessarily
lead to a 'race to the bottom"' but instead protects against "the
states' natural predisposition to abuse" their sovereign power.126
Auster and Silver entertain this idea and suggest that states "are
monopolistic service providers whose powers must be curbed."' 27
Further, "they implicitly welcome the commercialization of
sovereignty as a means of curbing the state's excesses." 28
B. Commercializationof Sovereignty as a Productof
Globalization
Although state sovereignty-and subsequently the society of
states-evolved and strengthened with the passage of time,
economic interdependence and globalization have been on the rise
since the end of nineteenth century.129 "[D]oubts ... as to whether
[the] principle of [state immunity] should be applied in cases
where states were engaging in commercial activity," according to
Stephen Neff, "highlight[] the basic incompatibility, in the
economic sphere, between the traditional prerogatives of
sovereigns and the smooth functioning of a liberal economic
system."o
In other words, the friction between national
sovereignty and the goals of economic liberalism has led to the

Id. (summarizing Tiebout, supra note 123, at 418-20).
Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 158 (citing Tiebout, supra note 123, at
418-420).
126 Id. (referring to GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (1992)).
127 Id (referring to RICHARD D. AUSTER & MORRIS SILVER, THE STATE AS A FIRM:
ECONOMIC FORCES IN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (1979)).
128 Id
129 Id at 168 (discussing the history of this trend).
130 STEPHEN C. NEFF, FRIENDS BUT No ALLIES: ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS 49 (John Gerard Ruggie & Helen Milner eds., 1990).
124
125
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"commercialization of sovereignty."' 3 1
States have navigated this question of "sovereignty" versus
serving "the interests of capital" since the nineteenth century.13 2
"To resolve [this dilemma] states were forced, somewhat
reluctantly, to accept the principle that legal persons could reside
concomitantly in a number of jurisdictions."'3 3 In Lauritzen v.
Larsen, the U.S. Supreme Court entertained the idea that foreignregistered ships could be liable in up to seven jurisdictions.'3 4 The
Court discussed the possibility of jurisdiction over a ship
registered in Denmark, but whose seamen were involved in an
incident in New York based on several theories: locality of the
wrongful act, law of the flag, nationality of the injured party,
nationality of the ship-owner, location where the agreement took
place, inaccessibility of other forums, and "the [f]aw of the
35
[fjorum."i
While the idea that a corporation can reside in multiple
jurisdictions "makes perfect sense from the perspective of national
sovereignty, sovereign equality, and national self-determination, it
has created huge problems for the regulatory capacity of the
state."l 3 6 Due to the ability of legal persons to reside in multiple
jurisdictions, corporations now "take advantage of the fiction of
their fragmentation by rearranging their legal existence in" the
most convenient and efficient manner for them.'3 7 The fact that
corporations "could 'reside' in one capacity in one [state] and in
another capacity in another [state]," has also fueled "the practice
of jurisdiction shopping" and subsequently the existence of tax
"This is the true meaning of the term 'international tax
havens.'
planning'; it is the planning of whichever aspect of their 'reality'
corporations or wealthy individuals are prepared to reveal at

131 Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 153, 164 (using this term and referring to
this relationship).
132 Id. at 168.
133 Id. at 172.

134 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582-93 (1953).
135 Id. at 583-84, 586-90.
136 Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 171.
137 Id. at 172.

138 Id. at 170, 172.
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whichever location.", 3 9
By "treating sovereignty as a commodity,"' 40 tax havens serve
a double function in the modem system of states: "They
demonstrate clearly [how] the modem state . .. accommodates

globalization" and free movement of capital, while at the same
time re-structure "the infrastructure of globalization." 4 1 Because
of the fictional nature of the corporate existence in tax havens, "a
virtual world of a state system can exist beside the 'real' state
system," while at the same time "feeding on its juridical and
political infrastructure." 4 2 In other words, tax havens are not an
anomaly in the international system; rather they are the product of

globalization.143
IV. International Bodies Monitoring Tax Haven Activity
Although tax havens have developed as a result of blurring
firms' national identity and globalization, the international
community has not simply accepted their existence. Starting with
the 1998 OECD report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging
Global Issue, the organization has "asked [its members] to
perform a self-review of [their] preferential tax regimes." 44 In
choosing to abstain from the report and its recommendations,
Switzerland argued that: (1) the report did not account for all
sectors of the economy and their combined effect in "distort[ing]
competition," (2) identifying one country with lower tax rates as
compared to another as having a preferential tax regime "results in
unacceptable protection of countries with high levels of taxation"
and goes against "the economic philosophy of the OECD," (3)
"tax regimes" have different structures and "exchange of
information" is not necessarily better or more efficient than tax
"withholding systems," and (4) the report is "selective and

139 Id. at 172.
140 Drezner, supra note 113, at 76.

Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 172.
Id
143 See id. (noting that attributes of tax havens "present the complex face of. . .
globalization").
144 PALAN, OFFSHORE WORLD, supra note 106, at xii (referring to O.E.C.D.,
HARMFUL TAx COMPETITION, supra note 109, at 13).
141

142
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repressive" and does not "effectively [address] excesses of tax
competition that develop[] outside of all rules."' 45
The Financial Stability Board was created in the wake of Asian
financial crisis of 1996 and 1997 to "assess vulnerabilities"I4 6 and
"to develop and promote the implementation of effective
regulatory, supervisory and other ... policies" in the interest of
"financial stability." 4 7 The Board "brings together national
authorities responsible for financial stability in significant
international financial centres, international financial institutions,
sector-specific international groupings of regulators and
supervisors, and committees of central bank experts."' 4 In 2000,
the Board published the Report of the Working Group on Offshore
Centers, which listed financial abuses in tax havens and
highlighted a few recommendations for cooperation and

transparency.14 9
Similarly the Financial Action Task Force (on Money
Laundering), established in 1989 on the G7 initiative, has created a
powerful name and shame list.' In 2000, the organization issued
a list of "Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories," and has
revised that list since that time.'"' While the organization does not
have to power to impose sanctions or pursue any legal remedies,15 2

145 O.E.C.D., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 109, at 77-78.
146 About the FSB: Mandate, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstability

board.org/about/mandate.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
147 About the FSB: Overview, FIN. STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstability

board.org/aboutloverview.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
148 Id.
149 See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 98, at 1-5 (showing the findings and

recommendations of the Financial Stability Board).
150

See History of the FATF, FIN.

ACTION TASK FORCE,

http://www.fatf-

gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (describing the
organization's origin).
151 See About the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) Initiative,
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperative

jurisdictions/more/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncctinitiative.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2012) (describing the project, which is no longer active as of 2006).
152

See

Who

We

Are, FIN. ACTION

TASK FORCE,

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/

pages/aboutus/whoweare (last visited Jan. 13, 2012) ("The FATF is therefore a 'policymaking body' which works to generate the necessary political will to bring about
national legislative and regulatory reforms in these areas.").
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the existence of the list and the association with countries that
protect terrorists or criminals creates immense international
pressure on tax havens.
The EU has also proactively combated tax havens by
introducing two important directives: the Savings Taxation
Directive, which serves to crack down on tax evasion, and the
Code of Conduct for Business Taxation."s3 The Savings Taxation
Directive came into force in 2005 and targets individuals.154 EU
member states have agreed "to automatically exchange
information about customers who earn savings income in one EU
member state but reside in another."15 5 This directive also
temporarily allowed some member states to utilize a "withholding
tax option," which permits deduction of tax at from savings
income at the source of the income.156 The Code of Conduct for
Business Taxation was established in 1998, and while "not a
legally

binding

instrument, . . .

it clearly . . . ha[s]

political

force."' 5 It prohibits member states "from introducing any new
harmful tax measures," and, further, from amending "any laws or
practices that are deemed to be harmful in respect of the principles
of the Code." 5 1
Although this is not a comprehensive list of all international
bodies that have worked to curb the harmful effect of tax havens,
these examples show that the international community has been
proactive in fighting tax havens both for security and economic
reasons. As will be elaborated at length later in this article the
international community has entered into bilateral, multilateral
agreements with tax haven states to curtail lost tax revenue. The
United States has even gone further by bringing tax haven banks

153 Council Directive 2003/48/EC, 2003 O.J (L 157) 38; Council Conclusions of the
ECOFIN Council Meeting on 1 Dec. 2007, 1998 O.J. (C2) 1.
154 See Rules Applicable, EUR. COMMISSION: TAX'N & CUSTOMS UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/taxation/personal_tax/savings tax/rules applicable/
indexen.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (describing the Directive and its purpose).
155 PALAN, OFFSHORE WORLD, supra note 106, at xiii.
156

Id.

157 Harmful Tax Competition, EUR. COMMISSION: TAX'N & CUSTOMS UNION,

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation customs/taxation/company tax/harmful taxpractices/index
en.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
158 Id. para. 4.
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into its court to demand transparency and cooperation.159
Furthermore, both the OECD and the G20'" have created a
"blacklist" for tax havens for the purpose of "naming and
shaming" states that do not comply with an "internationally agreed
tax standard.""' This article uses the case of Switzerland to
illustrate how international agreements, international institutions,
and domestic courts are tools that the international community has
used to restrict the use of state sovereignty for tax evasion
purposes.
V. Switzerland As a Case Study of Checks and Balances of the
International System of States on Sovereignty
Switzerland is an excellent case study to examine whether the
international system has the capacity to exercise a form of checks
and balances on state sovereignty because the country is, in many
ways, defined by its independence and neutrality from the system
of states. Gordon Sherman notes that "Swiss neutrality is an
[historical and] essential element of the country's governmental
existence, and it is intended by the nature and sanction of its
origins to be as permanent as the nation itself."1 62 This aspect of
Swiss identity was the result of "a historical, geographical,
political, military, and economic necessity."' 6 1 Indeed, neutrality
is so important to the Swiss that "only after an intense domestic
debate and a national referendum did the country join the UN on
September 10, 2002."'"
159 See Swiss Bank Refuses US Tax Request, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8028174.stm (discussing such a situation).
160 The G20 is a group of countries who "coordinate both economic and foreign
affairs policies using periodic meetings of high level officials." Sungjoon Che & Claire
R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance:A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 491, 516 (2012)
161 Nicholas Watt et al., G20 Declares Door Shut on Tax Havens: OECD
Publishing List of Member Countries That Do Not Comply with Its Rules, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/02/g20-summit-tax-havens.
162 Gordon E. Sherman, The Neutrality of Switzerland, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 242
(1981).
163

HELGA TURKU, ISOLATIONIST STATES IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 51-52

(2009) (discussing international treaties and agreements that gave rise to the Swiss
"perpetual neutrality").
164 Id.
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A. The Origins ofSwiss Banking Secrecy Law
There are two major schools of thought that attempt to explain
the origin of Swiss banking secrecy laws. S6bastien Guex has
detailed these schools and provided further context as to the
origins of Swiss secrecy laws.16 ' As Guex explains, the more
widely adopted theory of Swiss banking secrecy laws stipulates
that Swiss banking secrecy arose out of a desire to protect the
Jewish victims of Nazi persecution.166 Since the 1960s, many have
maintained that the secrecy laws were introduced in 1934 as part
of the Federal Banking Law.167 Philippe de Weck, former
president of the Union Bank of Switzerland, believes that the
Banking Secrecy Law was introduced into Swiss legislation
because of "this influx of capital belonging to the victims of
persecution."
Emissaries of Nazi organizations actually
followed the immigrants to Switzerland. They endeavored to
obtain information concerning the capital they held in Switzerland.
Once in possession of such information, they would have been in a
position to blackmail members of their families still in Germany.
It was in order to prevent such information from coming into the
possession of Nazi emissaries that a particularly stringent Banking
Secrecy Law was introduced into Swiss legislation at the time.169
De Weck maintains that this was a courageous act at the time
because Germany shared a border with Switzerland and could
He has further stated that the banking
have taken action.'
secrecy laws were almost a form of "humanitarian action.""'
Indeed, "many Swiss are proud of their banking-secrecy law,
because it ... has admirable origins (it was passed in the 1930s to

165 The discussion in this section draws in large part from Guex's 2000 article on
Swiss banking secrecy law. See S6bastien Guex, The Origins of the Swiss Banking
Secrecy Law and Its Repercussionsfor Swiss Federal Policy, 74 Bus. HIST. REV. 237
(2000).
166 Id. at 240 (arguing that this common view is incorrect).
167 Id. at 239.
168 This opinion is according to translations provided by Guex. Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Guex, supra note 165, at 239.
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help persecuted Jews protect their savings.)"l7 2
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Even scholars

critical of these laws admit that [b]anking "[s]ecrecy laws . . . were

introduced in 1934-in part to protect Jews who were depositing
money in Swiss Banks."' 73
The second school of thought maintains that the notion that
Switzerland wanted to protect Jewish victims is not supported by
facts. Guex argues that these laws were not introduced in 1934,
but were "merely reinforced at that time."' 7 4 More importantly, he
claims that there are no facts to support the claim that these laws
were introduced for "humanitarian reasons."'
Furthermore, the
way that the Swiss bankers have handled the accounts of victims
of the Holocaust calls into question the idea that Swiss banking
laws were designed with a humanitarian motivation in mind.17 6 As
will be further discussed in this article, descendants of Holocaust
victims are still trying to access some of their assets from Swiss
banks, which serviced both the Nazis and the Jewish
community.1
Before 1934, the Swiss Banking Laws were based more on
practice than a concrete body of law.'17 Several laws dealing only
with public banks existed in a few Swiss cantons.17 9 At one time,

172 Id. (quoting Keeping Mum, ECONOMIST, Feb. 17, 1996, at
173

78).

ADAM LEBOR, HITLER'S SECRET BANKERS: THE MYTH OF Swiss NEUTRALITY

DURING THE HOLOCAUST

4 (1997).

174 Guex, supra note 165, at 240.
'75

Id.

176 See id. at 240 (stating that the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law has been "severely
questioned" recently because of "the way bankers have handled the accounts of victims
of the Nazis"); see also Swiss FEDERAL ARCHIVES, FLIGHT FUNDS, LOOTED PROPERTY
AND DORMANT ASSETS: STATUS OF RESEARCH AND ITS PERSPECTIVES 52 (1997)
(discussing unclaimed dormant assets remaining from World War 11); see generally
INDEP. COMM. OF EMINENT PERSONS, REPORT ON DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF
NAZI PERSECUTION IN Swiss BANKS (1999) (reporting on the investigation of Nazi
victims' Swiss bank accounts).
177 For additional discussion about the efforts of Holocaust victims to access their
assets held in Swiss banks, see infra text accompanying note 359.
178 See Guex, supra note 165, at 240 ("At the time, this practice was based on
tradition rather than on a concrete law or set of laws.").
179 See id. (noting that the banking secrecy laws existing at the time were adopted
in only a few Swiss cantons). Switzerland is made up of twenty-two cantons, which are
similar to U.S. states. Id.
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banking secrecy was a civil matter and not a criminal one.'s
Consequently, the damaged party could only sue for damages in a
civil court.'"' The lack of rigorous laws in this area did not
prevent the widespread practice of banking secrecy, making it
difficult for the authorities to "pursue fiscal objectives."' 8 2 Even
though banking secrecy practices were well established in
Switzerland, its importance grew at the turn of the twentieth
century when several European states imposed increased taxation
on the their wealthy citizens.'
Located in a landlocked country with aggressive neighbors and
no "comparable industrial or commercial power," Swiss banks
could not compete with other financial centers such as London,
Paris, or Berlin.'8 4 This being the case, however, the Swiss
recognized an opportunity to react to a wave of tax increases
spreading across Europe.'
Given these circumstances, the Swiss
realized that their banks could offer customers an advantage that
others did not: the evasion of domestic taxation.'86 This tax
evasion became the Swiss strategy for attracting foreign capital
and becoming competitive in international finance even before
WWI.' Swiss banks advertised throughout Europe promoting the
advantages of their country as a tax haven.'
In an advertisement
distributed in France, a Swiss bank claimed that the laws in
Id
See id. (explaining that "sanctions could be imposed only if a claim had been
lodged by the injured party, and in the form of damages").
182 Id
183 Guex, supra note 165, at 240-41. In 1901, for example, France increased its
inheritance tax and laid the groundwork for the introduction of an income tax on high
revenues. Id at 241.
184 Id
180
181

185 See id (describing the opportunity seized by the Swiss banking industry to
compete as a tax haven on the international stage).
186 Id
187 See id ("For those in Swiss business circles, banking secrecy was no longer
simply an instrument with primarily internal functions that was designed to protect them
from the domestic tax authorities. It now also became an instrument with external
functions, a lynchpin in the strategy of attracting foreign capital to Switzerland and
hence a major asset in international competition.").
188 See Guex, supra note 165, at 241 (describing the campaign to promote Swiss
banking as "massive").
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Switzerland "enable[] [us] to manage with the utmost discretion
securities entrusted to our care by costumers abroad." 8 9 These
messages were so intense that the Swiss authorities feared
retaliation from foreign governments.'
The Swiss minister of
economy intervened by asking the banks to ease their claims.' 9 '
At the start of WWI, immense financial uncertainties and high
taxation allowed Swiss banks to flourish.'92 Foreign capital from
France, Germany, Italy, and Austria "poured into Swiss banks" at
an unprecedented rate.' 93 Swiss bank depositors were attracted to
Switzerland's neutrality, political stability, and mild taxation laws;
the stability of the Swiss franc; and, notably, Switzerland's
banking secrecy practices.' 94 Within a very short time, Swiss
banks enjoyed tremendous growth,'9 5 but it is difficult to establish
how much of this success can be contributed to foreign capital
from secrecy laws. "Switzerland became transformed into an
international financial center," whose status was further aided by
the establishment of the Bank for International Settlements. 9 6
Switzerland also became a "refuge of choice for foreign
capital,"' 97 able to both attract foreign capital and reinvest it
abroad under its own name.'19
Foreign governments, however, did not turn a blind eye to the

189

Id.
190 Id. (noting that the propaganda campaign was "intense" even before WWI and
that Swiss officials were "fearful" of retaliation from other governments).
191 See id. (citing DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES SUISSES 901 (V. 5 1983) for

comparison).
192 Id at 241-42 (explaining how the "political, financial, and monetary crises" in
Europe prior to WWI and the increase in domestic taxes in other countries led to
increased investment in Swiss banks).
193 Id. at 241.

Guex, supra note 165, at 241-42.
See id at 242 (describing the "spectacular takeoff' enjoyed by Swiss banks at
the time).
196 Id (quoting HUGo BANZIGER, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER BANKENAUFSICHT IN DER
194
195

SCHWEIZ SEIT DEM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 57 (1986)).
197 Id. at 242.

198 See id (noting that Switzerland became "a place for the reception of assets
coming from abroad, assets that were in turn lent abroad again, but this time under the
Swiss flag").
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massive exodus of international capital to Switzerland. 99 States
such as France and Belgium were very concerned by wealthy
citizens evading taxation by using Swiss bank accounts.20 0 In
addition, France and Belgium feared that the large amount of
German capital in Switzerland following WWI could endanger the
reparation payments imposed on Germany by the Treaty of
Versailles.20 ' France and Belgium attempted to gather information
about the identity of Swiss bank customers.202
At the end of WWI, these countries made "modest" efforts to
try to obtain information on individuals and entities that had
accounts in Switzerland.20 3 However, Swiss authorities refused to
make any concessions, with the full knowledge that "in several
countries . . . there will be deep resentment against Switzerland

because of this attitude."204 The Swiss knew that disclosing
information on foreign asset holders in Switzerland would
jeopardize its banking system.205 "The importance of banking
activity to the Swiss economy calls for the greatest prudence as far
as measures against tax evasion are concerned. This is why the
Committee of the Swiss Bankers' Association has likewise
decided

strictly

to reject . . . any measure

combating

this

evasion."206
Then, in the second half of 1931, Switzerland went through the
"worst banking crisis in its history."20 7 As a result of internal
pressure to stabilize the banking industry, the Federal Council
formulated a banking law in January 1933, drafting, among other
199 See id. (describing the efforts of foreign countries to stop the "massive exodus
of international capital to the Swiss haven").
200 Guex, supra note 165, at 242.
201

Id.
See id. (explaining France's and Belgium's actions as a direct result of the flight
of significant capital from these countries to Swiss banks).
203 Id.
204 Id. at 242-43 (quoting the Minutes of the Federal Council's meeting of Mar.
21,
1924, E 1004.1 (held in Swiss Federal Archives, 1924)).
205 Id. at 243 (describing Switzerland's efforts to protect banking secrecy as calling
for the "greatest prudence as far as measures against tax evasion are concerned").
206 Guex, supra note 165, at 243 (quoting the Minutes of the Federal Council's
meeting of Mar. 21, 1924, E 1004.1 (held in Swiss Federal Archives, 1924)).
207 Id. at 243.
202
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things, an article on banking secrecy. 208 This draft provision
passed without further substantive modification in November 1934
as article 47 of the Banking Law.209 Violation of the banking
secrecy provision under article 47 was considered a criminal
offense punishable with "heavy fines and up to six months'

imprisonment." 210
Swiss banking secrecy is protected through banking laws,

criminal laws, civil laws, and codes of professional obligation. 2 11
The Swiss Banking Act of 1934 codified the protection of bank
secrecy in Switzerland.2 12 These laws require that Swiss banks
preserve the privacy of their clients.2 13 Punishment for disclosing
such information includes criminal and civil liability.2 14
Moreover, anyone who "intentionally violates the duty of privacy
faces severe criminal sanctions, including imprisonment." 2 15
Id. at 244.
See id. ("[T]he future article 47 of the Banking Law voted by the Swiss
Parliament in November 1934 remained practically identical, in substance if not in form,
to the corresponding article of the February 1933 draft.").
210 Guex, supra note 165, at 244.
211 See Michele Moser, Comment, Switzerland: New Exceptions to Bank Secrecy
Laws Aimed at Money Laundering and Organized Crime, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
321, 324 (1995) ("Swiss banking secrecy derives from a diverse number of authoritative
legal sources .... ).
212 See Guex, supra note 165, at 244 (noting that the codification of the 1934 law
reinforced the importance of banking secrecy in Switzerland and provided a "clear basis"
for the practice in federal law).
213 See Peter C. Honegger, Jr., Demystification of the Swiss Banking Secrecy and
Illumination of the United States-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding,9 N.C. J. INT'L
L. & COM. REG. 1, 1-2 (1983) ("[B]anks must keep secret any information about their
clients regarding privacy and property, which they receive by practicing their
business.").
214 Guex, supra note 165, at 244.
215 Bradley J. Bondi, Don't Tread on Me: Has the United States Government's
Questfor Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knellfor Swiss Bank Secrecy
Laws?, 30 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 4 (2010) (summarizing Loi FEDERALE SUR LES
BANQUES ET LES CAISSES D'lPARGNE [LB] [Swiss FEDERAL BANKING ACT] Nov. 8,
1934, RECUEIL SYSTIMATIQUE DU DROIT FEDERAL [RS] 952.0, art. 47 (Switz.) [hereinafter
Swiss FEDERAL BANKING ACT OF 1934]).
Article 47 states: "Any person who willfully ... (b) in his capacity as organ,
officer or employee of a bank, as auditor or assistant auditor, as member of the
Banking Commission, officer or employee of its secretarial office, violates his
duty to observe silence or the professional secrecy, or whoever induces or
208
209
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Switzerland's laws are especially strict regarding acts of espionage
under the premise that such disclosure may harm the Swiss
economy.2 16 Articles 27 and 28 of the Swiss Civil Code protect
privacy rights of the individual and legal entities.2 17 Contract law,
agency law, and the good faith principles set forth in the Swiss
Civil Code create an implied duty of discretion for bankers.2 18
There are a few exceptions to Swiss secrecy laws.
Specifically, a client may instruct his Swiss bank to disclose his
information to a third party.2 19 In limited circumstances, Swiss
banks may divulge bank secrets to Swiss authorities, but not to
foreign entities.2 20 Until recently, the only way foreign authorities
attempts to induce a person to commit such an offense, shall be fined not more
than twenty thousand francs, and/or shall be imprisoned for not longer than six
months .

..

. If the offender acted negligently, the penalty is a fine of not more

than ten thousand francs."
Id. at 4 n.15. "In addition, Article 162 of the Swiss Criminal Code 'bars the disclosure
of commercial secrets by those legally or contractually obligated to maintain their
secrecy."'
Id at 4 n.17 (quoting SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB]
[CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, RS 311.0, art. 162 (Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss
CRIMINAL CODE]).

216 Swiss CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 215, art. 273. Article 273 states that anyone
who makes accessible a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign official, agency, or
foreign organization, private enterprise, or to any agents of the same, can be punished by
imprisonment or fine (or both). Id; see also Moser, supra note 211, at 324 ("Under
Article 273, dealing with 'espionage and the supplying of economic information to
foreign officials and private organizations,' the Swiss Penal Code imposes the duty of
banking secrecy on the financier under the theory that a disclosure of domestic
information might harm Switzerland economically.").
217 See Honegger, supra note 213, at 2 (noting that these articles provide protection
of "personality rights," including the rights of "natural and legal persons (i.e. corporate
bodies)").
218 See id. ("[D]iscretion is an implied contractual duty of the banker[;] ... the
banker has a general duty of discretion based on the mentioned good faith principle of
the Swiss Civil Code.").
219 See Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[S]ecrecy
required ... may be waived by the consent of the person.").
220 Honegger, supra note 213, at 8. It is important to note, however, that Swiss
bank secrecy laws are not designed to provide a competitive advantage to Swiss banks;
the bank privacy laws of Switzerland apply to all information located within
Switzerland, without regard to the nationality of the bank, account holder, or requesting
entity. See Minpeco v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) ("[T]he bank secrecy laws ... have the legitimate purpose of protecting
commercial privacy inside and outside Switzerland.").
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could access privileged information was through Swiss diplomatic
channels. 22 1 A number of treaties, which will be discussed later in
this article, allow the Swiss government to assist foreign
authorities by allowing Swiss banks to disclose client secrets.22 2
B. Events that Contributedto the Changes in Swiss
Banking Laws
In order to understand whether there is a form of checks and
balances in the international system of states, one needs to
examine whether the changes in Swiss banking laws were guided
by domestic interests or were the result of external pressure. If
they were the result of external pressure, what steps did the
international community take to curtail Switzerland's hold on bank
secrecy?
1. InternationalPressurefor Banking Transparency
i. The 2008 FinancialMeltdown
In 2009, UBS, a major Swiss financial institution, was forced
to pay over $700 million in fines and disclose thousands of names
of U.S. customers hiding assets at UBS avoid taxation in the
United States. One of the most important causes of the UBS
exposure223 was the pressure from all US states impacted by the
meltdown of the US financial markets in 2008.224 According to
the US Senate Committee on Investigations, the United States
loses roughly $100 billion in tax revenue annually from foreign
investment.22 5 Specifically, the Committee believes that about
221 See Honegger,supra note 213, at 8 ("Foreign authorities have to request judicial
assistance by their diplomatic missions unless there is a special agreement.").
222 See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May
25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019 (noting that, under certain circumstances, information a bank
would ordinarily keep secret under Swiss law may be shared).
223 Sara Hansard, UBS Fined $780 Million in Tax Evasion Scandal, INVESTMENT
NEWS (Feb. 19, 2009), www.investmentnews.com/article/20090219/free/902199983
(subscription required).
224 Id
225 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
I IOTH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1 (Comm. Print

2008) (noting that the U.S. loses $100 billion loss in tax revenues each year to offshore

tax abuses).
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$14.8 billion worth of American assets are hidden in secret Swiss
accounts.22 6 In early 2009, OECD listed Switzerland on its "grey
list" and threatened to impose financial sanctions on Switzerland
for not cooperating in tax evasion cases with other states. 2 27 The
United States increased pressure on Switzerland to modify their
approach to bank secrecy.22 8
The United States determines that a state is a tax haven in two
different ways: an objective approach and a subjective approach.
The objective approach defines a tax haven state as "any nation
which has no tax or a low rate of tax on all or certain categories of
income and which offers a certain level of banking or commercial
secrecy." 2 29 The subjective approach defines a state as a tax haven
if "it promotes itself as one, and those who specialize in
international tax planning consider it to be one." 230 Accordingly,
before the UBS agreement, Switzerland was a tax haven under
both approaches because it enabled American citizens to invest
without paying taxes, had strict banking confidentiality, and its
banks actively marketed their private banking services to US
clients to avoid paying taxes. 23 1
Strict privacy laws and banking expertise make Switzerland an
attractive tax haven for wealthy Americans. In 2008, the Senate
Committee on Investigations found that UBS alone "maintain[ed]
. an estimated 19,000 US clients 'undeclared' accounts in
226 See David Crawford, Swiss to Review Banking Secrecy Laws, WALL ST. J., Mar.
7, 2009, at A7 (discussing the amount of assets owned by U.S. citizens and held by UBS,
a Zurich, Switzerland-based bank).
227 See Switzerland Removed from OECD "Grey List," BAHAMAS FIN. SERVICES
BOARD (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.bfsb-bahamas.com/news.php?cmd=view&id=2842
(discussing Switzerland and Qatar's signature of a Double Taxation Agreement (DTA),
which paved the way for Switzerland's removal from OECD's "grey list").
228 See L. Gordon Crovitz, Swiss Banks and the End of Privacy, WALL ST. J., Mar.
23, 2009, at A13 (discussing the efforts of the U.S. and other nations to influence
Switzerland to modify the country's privacy laws to allow for increased disclosure,
particularly in cases of tax evasion).
229 Douglas J. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens for the Purpose of
CriminallyEvading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 678 (1982).
230 Id.
231 See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 0960033,
9 (S.D.FLA. Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Deferred Prosecution Agreement]
(discussing the ways UBS defrauded the IRS and was enabled under Swiss law).
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Switzerland with billions of dollars in assets that have not been
disclosed to US tax authorities."2 32 In light of the ease with which
US citizens were able to hide their assets and avoid paying taxes
and the 2008 financial crisis, the United States announced a plan
to reform corporate taxation.233 In May 2009, the White House
declared that it would strictly enforce laws against tax haven abuse
in an effort to raise $8.7 billion in tax revenues.23 4 US President
Barack Obama stated that "[i]f financial institutions won't
cooperate with us, we will assume that they are sheltering money
in tax havens, and act accordingly." 235
President Obama was not the only world leader to take such a
stern stand against tax evasion in light of what has become known
as the "Great Recession." 23 6 In September 2008, British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown called for a new global financial system
to bring an end to financial turmoil. 23 7 Specifically, he called on
all UN members to "build a new global financial order founded on
transparency, not opacity; rewarding success, not excess;
responsibility, not impunity; and which is global, not national." 23 8
He stated that cooperation, not isolationism and protectionism, is
the solution to "living in a global age." 239 At a time of financial
232

STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,

supra note 225, at 8.
233 See Carolyn B. Lovejoy, UBS Strikes a Deal: The Recent Impact of Weakened
Bank Secrecy on Swiss Banking, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 435, 437 (2010) (describing the
Obama Administration's plan to strictly enforce laws against tax haven abuse in an effort
to raise significant tax revenues).
234 Id
235 The Last Days of Bank Secrecy?, PODER360
(Sept.
2009),
http://www.poder360.com/article detail.php?id article=2496.
236 See generally Courtney Schlisserman, 'Great Recession' Gets Recognition as
Entry in AP Stylebook, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ayojB2KWQG4k (stating that the phrase the "Great
Recession" is now officially used for the economic downturn beginning in December
2007).
237 See British Leader Issues Call at UNfor New Financial Order to End Market
Turmoil, UN
NEWS
CTR.
(Sept.
26,
2008),
http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?Cr-general+assembly&Crl=debate&NewslD=28300
("The
Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom today called for a new global financial system to bring
an end to the current economic turmoil . . .
238 Id.
239 Id.
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crisis, a place like Switzerland, home to nearly a third of all wealth
stashed in tax havens (nearly $2.2 trillion), became an easy target
for governments seeking revenue to finance their own economic
stimulus programs.24 0
The international community has fought bank secrecy laws
since long before the Great Recession because of significant
economic losses in tax evasions.241 Tax havens are located in
some of the largest financial centers on the globe.242 Although
these states account only for three percent of the world's gross
domestic product (GDP), "half of the world trade appears to pass
through tax havens."243 Specifically, at least $11 trillion are held
in offshore banks where capital is subject to little or no taxation.244
Swiss banks manage one-third of all cross-border private
banking.24 5 While the Swiss do not generally tax income earned
on capital invested in foreign locations at the home country's rate,
the country does impose a withholding tax.246 Interest earned on
See Emma Thomasson, US Civil Case No Big Threat to UBS-Swiss Regulator,
(Feb. 21, 2009), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/02/21/ubs-idUTKLL61373
220090221 ("Tax-dodging schemes are increasingly under attack by governments
scrambling to find revenue needed to finance the soaring costs of government stimulus
programmes.").
241 See Greg Brabec, The Fightfor Transparency: InternationalPressure to Make
Swiss Banking Procedures Less Restrictive, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 231, 251
(2007) ("Tax haven countries have become some of the largest and most active
economic markets in the world, despite being some of the smallest countries."); see also
Bruno Gurtner, Tax Evasion: Hidden Billions for Development, in SOCIAL WATCH
REPORT 2004: FEAR AND WANT, OBSTABLES TO HUMAN SECURITY 24, available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPANO18181.pdf
(noting that the large U.S. tobacco companies Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds moved
their international headquarters to Switzerland in the mid-1990s and noting that shifting
the tax burden to tax haven states especially threatens developing countries).
242 See generally Gurtner, supra note 241 (discussing the ways tax haven states
function and benefit companies and wealthy individuals, among others).
243 Id. at 24.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Brabec, supra note 241, at 253; see also Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit
Information with Other Countries:Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?,
6 FLA. TAX REV. 579, 601 (2004) (describing the Savings Directive adopted by EU
countries, which provides for "automatic [tax] information exchange on interest paid
within the EU to a EU resident" and allows certain EU countries, excluding Switzerland,
to impose a withholding tax).
240

REUTERS
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capital investments is generally underreported or not reported at
all.247
Among other countries, the United States, Japan, and the EU
have threatened to limit investments if Switzerland does not
address its taxation loopholes and bank secrecy laws.248 In 2009,
Switzerland was added to the OECD's list of "[j]urisdictions that
have committed to the internationally agreed tax standard, but
have not yet substantially implemented" it due to its lack of
cooperation. 24 9 To get off this list, Switzerland would eventually
enter into twelve bilateral tax cooperation agreements with the
OECD.250 Moreover, Switzerland would have to effectively
implement those agreements, instead of using its definition of tax
fraud and the application of double incrimination as a shield to
restrict information exchange in cases that constitute criminal tax
cases in the OECD countries.2 5'
The change was a contentious point between the OECD and
Switzerland because Switzerland expressly placed a restriction on

Brabec, supra note 241, at 253.
See id (noting that these countries have threatened "investment curbs" if the
Swiss government does not adequately address "taxation loopholes").
249 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE
JURISDICTIONS SURVEYED BY THE OECD GLOBAL FORUM IN IMPLEMENTING THE
INTERNATIONALLY
AGREED
TAX
STANDARD
(2009),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/14/42497950.pdf.
For more information on
international tax cooperation, see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., TOWARDS
GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2009 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING AND
247

248

RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING
ELIMINATING
HARMFUL
TAX
PRACTICES
(2000),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/27/44430257.pdf.
250 See generally Miseror, Double Tax Treaties and Tax Information Exchange
Agreements: What Advantages for Developing Countries?, TAX JUST. NETWORK,
http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/DTTs_100126_TIEAs-DevelopingCountries.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (describing the OECD Model Tax Convention
on Income and Capital, Double Tax Treaties (DTTs), and Tax Information Exchange
Agreements (TIEAs) as the primary tools for meeting international goals for tax
transparency and noting that any jurisdiction that signs twelve or more of these
agreements "is considered cooperative" and removed from OECD's list of "noncommitting or non-implementing countries").
251 See Brabec, supra note 241, at 251 ("[The] principal [of 'double incrimination']
means that to receive information on a person's bank account, the crime must be a crime
in both the home country and the host country." (emphasis added)).
AND

N.C. J.INT'L L. &COM. REG.

844

Vol. XXXVIII

Article 26(1) of the OECD Model Tax Convention to protect its
secrecy laws.252 Article 26(1) requires that "[tihe competent
authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such
information as is foreseeably relevant for carrying out the
provisions of this Convention . .. insofar as the taxation
[t]hereunder is not contrary to the Convention." 25 3 Specifically, to
meet this article's requirements, Switzerland would have to
provide administrative assistance to states that seek "justified and
specific" information about the requesting country's citizens.254
The request must specify the foreign taxpayer's personal data and
the Swiss entity that can provide that information.2 55 Until March
13, 2009, when the Swiss Federal Council announced that
Switzerland would offer administrative assistance in individual
cases where there is well-founded suspicion of tax fraud,256 the
Swiss showed reservation about Article 26, indicating that it
provides for the dissemination of information relevant only to the
contracting states' domestic tax laws.257
After the UBS controversy, Switzerland changed its position
on the issue and entered into twelve bilateral taxation agreements
252 See Peter R. Altenburger, Presentation:Exchange of Information: Switzerland's
Position Evolves Over Time (May 25, 2000), http://www.altenburger.ch/uploads/
tx altenburger/pa_2000 Seminar on Swiss Taxation.pdf ("Switzerland has issued a
reservation on Art. 26 of the OECD Model Convention. It will propose to limit the
scope of this Article to information which is necessary to carry out the provisions of the
Convention.").
253 OECD Comm. On Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on
Capital,art. 26(1) (amended 2008).
254 Toni Amonn, InternationalAspects, TAXATION.CH, http://www.taxation.ch/
index.php?id=33 (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).
255 Id.

256 See Switzerland's Engagement with International Bodies That Deal with Tax
Matters,

Swiss

CONFEDERATION

FED.

DEP'T

FIN.,

http://www.efd.admin.ch/

themen/steuern/02386/index.html?lang=en (last updated Dec. 22, 2011) (noting that
Switzerland decided to withdraw its reservation to the OECD model convention); see
generally Articles of the Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on
Capital, OECD (Jan. 23, 2003) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf
(providing the model treaty developed by O.E.C.D.).
257 See Altenburger, supra note 252, at 2 ("Switzerland's negative attitude on
providing information which may only be relevant with respect to the other Contracting
States' domestic tax laws, has led to a distinction between administrative assistance and
legal assistance.").
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as required by the OECD. 2 58 Additionally, Switzerland adopted
the OECD standard on administrative assistance in fiscal
matters. 259 This assistance, however, is only administrative and
not legal.260 Switzerland may grant legal assistance if there are
sufficient facts to lead to the conclusion that a crime may have
been committed.26'
The March 13, 2009 announcement blurred the distinction
between tax fraud and tax evasion.2 62 Until this time, using
fraudulent practices or producing false documents constituted tax
fraud and was a criminal matter,26 3 while tax evasion, defined as
"the non-reporting or the incomplete reporting of income or assets
without any further manipulations,"264 was a civil matter. Thus,
"banks had no duty to provide information to tax authorities." 2 65
258 See Switzerland Removed from OECD "Grey List, supra note 227 (stating that
Switzerland signed twelve agreements to provide "administrative assistance in tax
matters").
259 See Switzerland to Adopt OCED Standard on Administrative Assistance in

Fiscal Matters, Swiss

CONFEDERATION

FED.

DEP'T

FIN.

(Mar.

13,

2009),

http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformationen/00467/index.html?lang=e
n&msg-id=25863 (noting that Switzerland adopted OECD's standard on administrative
assistance in accordance with Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention).
260 Carolyn Michelle Najera, Combatting Offshore Tax Evasion: Why the United
States Should Be Able to Prevent American Tax Evaders From Using Swiss Bank
Accounts to Hide Their Assets, 17 Sw. J. INT'L L. 101, 120 (2010) (citing Altenburger,
supra note 252, at 2).
261 Altenburger, supra note 252, at 3 ("In order for Switzerland to grant legal
assistance it is not necessary that the facts are being proven, it is enough if the facts are
leading to the conclusion that a crime may have been committed.").
262 See id. at 2 (stating the difference between tax avoidance, fraud, and evasion).
263 See Honegger, supra note 213, at 7 (showing some cantons treat tax fraud as a
crime, including the cantons where the major banking centers of Switzerland are
located); see generally Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir.
1972) (finding that although an individual Swiss canton may have its own procedural
rules that could override the Swiss Federal Banking Act in a proceeding pending in that
canton, a canton procedural rule would not apply to a proceeding in the United States).
264 Bondi, supra note 215, at 18; Honegger, supra note 213, at 7.
265 See Honegger,supra note 213, at 7 (stating that Cantonal tax laws do not provide
for a duty to distribute information to tax authorities); see also Bernhard F. Meyer, Swiss
Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw. ENG. L. REV.
18, 32 (1979) ("[I]n administrative trial court proceedings, rules of civil procedure may
be applicable since governing administrative laws often refer to the civil code with
regard to the proper court procedure.").
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On the other hand, in the United States, tax evasion is a criminal
violation.266 Due to this distinction in Swiss law, the banks would
only transfer information to U.S. authorities "where the equivalent
of criminal tax fraud had occurred under Swiss law, not mere tax

evasion."2 67
Since the March 13, 2009 decision, however, Swiss authorities
have allowed the exchange of information with other states in
individual cases where a justified and specific request has been
made. 268 By providing administrative assistance in prosecuting tax
evaders, Switzerland is now in compliance with Article 26 of the
OECD Model Tax Convention. 269 According to the Swiss Federal
Council, the decision to provide administrative assistance to a
foreign government does not mean that there will be "any form of
automatic exchange of information. "270
ii. Switzerland Tax Treaties
Two of the earliest agreements regarding information
exchange between Switzerland and the United States are the
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters in 1975
(TMACM) and the Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income in 1951 (the
Convention). 271 "The TMACM provides that Swiss authorities
must make certain identifying information available to the US that
would assist in investigating and prosecuting [offenses] listed in

266 See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006) (outlining the offense of "[a]ttempt to evade or
defeat tax"); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7202 (2006) (outlining the offense of "[w]illful failure
to to file return, provide information, or pay tax); 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2006) (outlining the
offense of "[fjraud and false statements").
267 Bondi, supra note 215, at 6.
268 See id.
269

See Swiss BANKERS Ass'N,

RESULTS OF EXPLORATORY TALKS BETWEEN

SWITZERLAND AND GERMANY 4 (2010), available at http://www.swissbanking.org/en/

sbvg20101014-5000-masterdoku-einigunguk def-tsu.pdf.
270 Switzerland Eases Its Stance on Bank Secrecy Rules, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK

(Mar. 13, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/13/switzerland-eases-its-stanceon-bank-secrecy-rules/.
271 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, U.S.-Switz., May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1751; Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019.
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the treaty," such as murder, rape, and fraud.2 72 The following are
conditions for providing identifying information that was
previously held secret:
(a) the request concerns the investigation or prosecution of a
serious offense, (b) the disclosure is of importance for obtaining
or proving facts which are of substantial significance for the
investigation or proceeding; and (c) reasonable but unsuccessful
efforts have been made in the United States to obtain the
evidence or information in other ways.273
However, the power of TMACM is limited, as Switzerland can
refuse to assist the United States if it "considers that the execution
of the request is likely to prejudice its sovereignty, security or
similar essential interests."2 74 "This 'general safeguarding clause'
ensures that Switzerland could 'plead important interests' in order
to refuse a request of the US." 275 Moreover, since establishing its
banking secrecy laws, Switzerland has "been diligent in rejecting
generalized requests for information concerning large groups of
people, or 'fishing expeditions."' 276 The TMACM does not list tax
evasion as one of the offenses that would mandate providing
information.2 77 "Therefore, Switzerland can limit the effect of
TMCAM on tax evasion investigations because it can claim
protection against prejudice to sovereignty and national

interests." 278
In 1982, Switzerland and the United States signed the
Memorandum of Understanding (Swiss MOU) after increased

272 Carolyn B. Lovejoy, UBS Strokes a Deal: The Recent Impact of Weaked Bank
Secrecy on Swiss Banking, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 435, 444-45 (2010) (citing Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 271, art. 23 (stating that the Swiss
Central Authority will handle requests for assistance)).
273 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 271, art. 10.
274 Id. art. 3.
275 Lovejoy, supra note 272, at 445 (quoting Urs Martin Lauchli, Swiss Bank
Secrecy with ComparativeAspects to the American Approach, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 865,
875 (1998)).
276 Lauchli, supra note 275, at 876.
277 See generally Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 271
(showing tax evasion is not a listed offense).
278 Lovejoy, supra note 272, at 445.
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pressure from the latter. 279 "The Swiss MOU was specifically
designed to deal with insider trading inefficiencies of the Swiss
MLAT." 28 0 Through this MOU, Switzerland would cooperate in
insider trading investigations by establishing mechanisms to
collect the needed information.28 1 In 1981, Switzerland also
enacted the law on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters (IMAC), which allowed Swiss authorities to provide legal
assistance to other states for offenses that were considered a crime
in Switzerland.28 2
The 1951 Convention for the Avoidance Double Taxation
between Switzerland and the United States also "ensures an
effective information exchange to prevent fraud and to avoid both
283
nations 'claiming the right to tax the same stream of income."'
To fulfill their obligations under the Convention, Switzerland and
the United States maintain direct information exchange with each
other.284 Through this Convention, the authorities are able to
"prescribe procedures to carry out the purposes of this
Convention., 28 5 However, the Convention did not address tax
evasion until the parties entered into a protocol to the Convention
on September 23, 2009, which "expand[ed] this cooperation to tax
evasion as well as tax fraud . .. 286 According to the Protocol,
"Switzerland cannot refuse to give information to the US because
the 'information is held by a bank."' 287 If such a case arises, Swiss
Najera, supra note 260, at 116; see also Jennifer A. Mencken, Supervising
Secrecy: Preventing Abuses Within Bank Secrecy and Financial Privacy Systems, 21
279

B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 461, 482 (1998).

Naj era, supra note 260, at 116.
281 See Robert Louis Stauter, Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws and the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 623, 631 (1988) (outlining the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the MOU and its functioning).
282 Najera, supra note 260, at 117 (citing Lauchli, supra note 275, at 873).
283 Lovejoy, supra note 272, at 445 (quoting Workman, supra note 229, at 687).
284 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, supra note 271.
285 Id. art. 29.
286 Daniel Pruzin, Swiss Court Orders UBS to Notify Clients Before Turning
280

Account Details Over to U.S., BNA BANKING DAILY (Sept. 25, 2009).

287 Protocol Amending the Convention Between the Swiss Confederation and the
United States of America for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes
on Income, U.S.-Switz., art. 3 § 5, Sept. 23, 2009, Treaty Doc. 112-01.
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authorities 'have the power to enforce disclosure of
information. "'288
The 2009 Protocol built upon other agreements between the
two states. In 1996, the United States and Switzerland signed the
Tax Information Exchange Act (1996 Agreement), 28 9 which aimed
to share information and "specifically addressed fraudulent
conduct." 29 0 However, as seen with previous attempts, this treaty
did not yield the results the United States had hoped for due to
Switzerland's restrictive double incrimination principle and a lack
of administrative assistance.29 1
The 2003 Tax Information Exchange Act (2003 Act) sought to
supplement the 1996 Agreement 292 by proving that "the states will
exchange information necessary to properly implement the
provisions of the convention or to prevent tax fraud or the like in
relation to the taxes that are the subject of the convention." 29 3 The
2003 Act sought to ensure better information exchange between
the two states to ensure that funds associated with illicit activities,
such as tax evasion were not protected in safe havens. 2 9 4 "The use
of the phrase 'tax fraud or the like' [within the 2003 Act] was a
significant step forward as it signal[ed] that the Swiss [were]
willing to work around" their strict fraud tax statues and
definitions that have shielded money in Swiss accounts for
decades. 295 Both states agreed that fraud was an exception to the

288 Lovejoy, supra note 272, at 452 (quoting Protocol Amending the Convention
Between the Swiss Confederation and the United States of America for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, supra note 287, art. 3, § 5).
289 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, supra note 271, art. 26.
290 Brabec, supra note 241, at 254.
291

Id. at 254-55.
292 Id. at 255.
293

ORG.

FOR EcON.

CO-OPERATION AND DEV., IMPROVING

ACCESS TO BANK

INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES: THE 2003 PROGRESS REPORT 10 (Jun. 23, 2003),

availableat http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchangeofinformation/14943184.pdf.
294 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Announces Mutual
Agreement with Switzerland Regarding Tax Information Exchange (Jan. 24, 2003),
availableat http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/kd3795.aspx.
295 Brabec, supra note 241, at 255.
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protection of personal and banking privacy.2 96
Switzerland has also entered into Double Taxation Treaties
with seventy-two other states.29 7 These treaties enable states to
obtain taxes from their citizens who hold accounts in Swiss
banks.29 8 In turn, non-residents are able to obtain a partial or total
refund of tax withheld by the Swiss paying agent.299
The Swiss tax policy can be summarized as follows:
Switzerland does not levy taxes on Swiss accounts owned by nonresidents.3 00 There are three exceptions to this rule. First,
"[d]ividends and interest paid by Swiss companies are subject to a
35% withholding tax. The bank will keep 35% of the interest or
dividend and send it to the Swiss tax authorities on a no-name
basis."30
Foreigners are taxed only if they invest in Swiss
companies.302 Second, U.S. citizens, green card holders, and U.S.
taxpayers must inform the IRS of their Swiss accounts.30 3 Third,
in 2001, Switzerland agreed to "extend its 35% withholding tax on
resident savings income to non-resident account holders, and to
distribute much of the tax collected among EU member
states .. ..
Thus, EU residents "will have to pay a withholding
tax on the interest paid by certain investments. This tax starts at
15% and will gradually reach 35%. No exchange of information
nor any taxes on capital or capital gains will be levied."30 5 Both
Germany and Great Britain have started to reap the benefits of this
agreement.306

296 Id; Beckett G. Cantley, The New Tax Information Agreement: A Potent Weapon
Against U.S. Tax Fraud?,4 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.G. 231, 232 (2004).
297 Switzerland: Double Tax Treaties, LOWTAX GLOBAL TAX & Bus. PORTAL,

http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/jsw2tax.html (last visited Jan 15, 2013).
298 See id.
299 Id.
300 See id.

301 No Taxes on Your Swiss Account, MICHELOUD & CIE, http://switzerland.isyours.
com/e/banking/tax.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
302 See id.
303 See id.

304 Switzerland: Double Tax Treaties, supra note 297.
305 No Taxes on Your Swiss Account, supra 301.
306 See Trouble Island,supra note 87, at 68.
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iii. InternationalPressurefor Cooperationafter 9/11

The events of 9/11 had a serious impact on both the economic
and political landscape of the international system. In the wake of
this tragedy, states around the world agreed on the need for greater
cooperation and, subsequently, more transparency.3 07 9/11 brought
into fruition the idea that no state is immune from terrorist attacks
in a highly interconnected world.
Prior to 9/11, Switzerland signed a number of multilateral and
bilateral international mutual assistance treaties including the
following: the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (1959); the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters with the USA (1973); the Federal Act on
International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1983, as
amended in 1997); the European Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime
(1993).0

The 1997 amendments to the Federal Act on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters "enable[ed] the transmission of
documents and information abroad for the purposes of criminal
proceedings."30 9 However, "the transmission of such information
requires the permission of the Swiss police authorities who must
inform the customer about the order and give him a right to
appeal.""o Switzerland will only exchange information regarding
the individual who is the subject matter of the investigation.31 l
Moreover, information will not be transmitted if: "the offence
alleged is not equally punishable in Switzerland"; "the foreign
authorities might use the information for purposes other than those
for which it was requested"; "the requesting state does not offer
Switzerland reciprocal treatment in these matters"; or "the offence
is related to tax, politics or military matters."312
According to James Nason, head of international

308

See Brabec, supra note 241, at 239.
Switzerland: Double Tax Treaties,supra note 297.

309

Id.

310

See id.

311

Id.

312

Id.

307
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communications at the Swiss Bankers Association,
Swiss judicial sovereignty and the laws that protect it were not
written to frustrate legitimate criminal investigations by foreign
governments, and Switzerland has been a very reliable partner in
the international fight against money laundering, the financing
of terrorism and other crimes. After 9/11, Switzerland was one
of the first countries fully in a position to help the United States
trace and freeze assets linked to terrorist organizations.1
In the wake of 9/11, Switzerland reiterated its commitment to stop
individuals and organizations suspected of terrorism from
accessing its banking system. 314 "Even though the Swiss do not
have specific anti-terrorism provisions within the Swiss penal
code, Swiss law does have provisions relating to murder, hostagetaking, and the use of explosives with criminal intent, all of which
are penal norms that implicitly apply to terrorism.""' Moreover,
the Money Laundering Act "requires all financial intermediaries to
freeze the accounts that they reasonably suspect are involved in
the commission of criminal activities, including terrorism
financing and money laundering.,316 Once an account is frozen, it
must be reported to the Money Laundering Reporting Office of
Switzerland."' In 2003, Switzerland amended the penal code to
allow banks to freeze assets and punish those who intend to
finance a future crime. 318 Due to these changes, Switzerland froze
eighty-two bank accounts (nearly $25.5 million of assets) linked to
Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Osama bin Laden."'
The recent amendment to Swiss law could have been partially
influenced by the Uniting and Strengthening America by
313 James Nason, Another View: Why Privacy Matters to the Swiss, N.Y. TIMES

(Feb. 11, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/1 1/another-view-whyprivacy-matters-to-the-swiss/.
314 See Brabec, supra note 241, at 246.
DEALBOOK

315 Id.; see also SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE]

Nov. 8, 1934, SR 311, RS 311, art. 162 (Switz.) (containing the language of the Swiss
secrecy law).
316 Brabec, supra note 241, at 246.
317 Id.
318 See id.; see also SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH, supra note 318, art. 72

(containing law pertaining to the seizure of assets of those participating in crime).
319 Brabec, supra note 241, at 247.
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Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act).320 In an attempt to defeat
bank secrecy, U.S. banks are prohibited from wiring money to
what U.S. authorities classify as shell banks.32' US banks must
also ask their new clients if they are US citizens, and if they are
not, new clients must state their occupation and whether they will
be wiring money abroad.322 Title III of the Patriot Act (the
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist
Financing Act of 2001) creates heightened identification
requirements for opening bank accounts.3 23 Furthermore, all
320 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
321 Shell banks are not per se illegal; however, their activities support underground
economy and are usually based in tax havens.
322 See Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Money Laundering: Life After
the
Patriot
Act
(May
2,
2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch555.htm#P1 15_ 18198; see also John J. Byrne,
Banks

and

the

USA

PATRIOT

Act,

EcoN.

PERSPECTIVES

(Sept.

2004),

http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=455637. John J. Byrne serves as the director of the
American Bankers Association's (the "ABA") Center for Regulatory Compliance. Id.
323 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 326, 115 Stat. 272, 317-18
(2001). The Patriot Act states:
(1) IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF ACCOUNTHOLDERS(1) IN GENERAL-Subject to the requirements of this subsection, the
Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations setting forth the minimum
standards for financial institutions and their customers regarding the identity of
the customer that shall apply in connection with the opening of an account at a
financial institution.
(2) MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS-The regulations shall, at a minimum,
require financial institutions to implement, and customers (after being given
adequate notice) to comply with, reasonable procedures for-(A) verifying the
identity of any person seeking to open an account to the extent reasonable and
practicable; (B) maintaining records of the information used to verify a person's
identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; and (C)
consulting lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations
provided to the financial institution by any government agency to determine
whether a person seeking to open an account appears on any such list.
(3) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED-In prescribing regulations under this
subsection, the Secretary shall take into consideration the various types of
accounts maintained by various types of financial institutions, the various
methods of opening accounts, and the various types of identifying information
available.
Id
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financial institutions must implement anti-money laundering
compliance programs.3 24
One aspect of the Patriot Act that is in sharp contrast with
Swiss privacy laws is Section 314. Specifically, this section
requires financial institutions to check account holders' names for
potential matches with names on government watch lists. 325
United States Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
sends requests pursuant to § 314(a), and financial institutions have
two weeks to complete their review and respond with any
matches.3 26 In the post 9/11 era, financial institutions operating in
the United States are required to report suspicious financial
activity "in real time" and verify the identity of account holders.32 7
All financial institutions operating in the United States are
required to exercise due diligence.32 8 They are reviewed by
federal banking agencies and criticized if they fail to exercise due
diligence in reviewing high-risk relationships.329
In its 2004 review of the Patriot Act, the 9/11 Commission
found that the Act was a positive development but that it needed to
intensify efforts to expand and improve communication between
actors.3 30 Specifically, the commission stated that "[v]igorous
efforts to track terrorist financing must remain front and center in
the US counterterrorism efforts." 3 ' They cited "multilateral
diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, and concerted international
action, such as through the [Financial Action Task Force], FATF,
as key components to successfully combating terrorist financing
activities."332 Through the Patriot Act, the United States was able

See id. § 352, 322.
325 See id. § 314, 307-08.
326 See id § 310, 329-32; see also Byrne, supra note 321, at 20.
327 Byrne, supra note 321, at 19.
324

328

Id.
329 Id.; USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
(2001).
330 See Byrne, supra note 321, at 21.
331

§ 312, 115 Stat. 272, 304-06

NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMissioN

REPORT 382 (2004), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-91 1REPORT/
pdf/GPO-91 I REPORT.pdf.
332 Brabec, supra note 241, at 249.
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to curtail bank privacy domestically and heavily impact policies of
foreign banks operating on its soil.333 In the name of public safety,
the Patriot Act aggressively targeted bank secrecy and the Act
affected not only Switzerland but all other states that guard the
privacy of foreign capital.3 34
Following 9/11, the international community was also
mobilized in targeting terrorist financing. Specifically, FATF
established the "Forty Recommendations" targeting money
laundering, and terrorist financing.3 35 In 2001, FATF added Eight
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, creating a
framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.33 6
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed the 1373
resolution requiring all member states to freeze any assets linked
The UNSC Resolution 1390
to terrorist organizations.3 37
specifically required all members States to freeze the assets of
Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and their agents.338 Additionally,
"[t]he UNSC formed a Sanctions Committee in Resolution 1267
The duties of the Sanctions
with regards to Afghanistan.
Committee include the maintenance and updating of lists of
individuals and entities subject to sanctions under these
resolutions, which all States are obligated to apply."33 9 Although
Switzerland joined the UN on September 10, 2002 without signing

333 See id. ("Aside from domestic law changes, both the United States and
Switzerland adhere to various international agreements.").
334 See id. at 247-48.
335 Alison S. Bachus, From Drugs to Terrorism: The Focus Shifts in the
InternationalFight Against Money Laundering After September II, 2001, 21 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 835, 848 (2004).
336 Id. at 860.
337 S.C. Res. 1373,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
338 S.C. Res. 1390, 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002). Resolution 1390
was strengthened by Resolution 1455 and later by Resolution 1526. See S.C. Res. 1455,
U.N. Doc. SIRES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30,
2004).
339 Brabec, supra note 241, at 250; see also S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333
(Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005); S.C. Res. 1735,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1822, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June
30, 2008); S.C. Res. 1904, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009); S.C. Res. 1989, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1989 (June 17, 2011).
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t4ese resolutions, it has since agreed to be bound by them.34 0
2. Impactfrom the InternationalNorms ofEthics
Switzerland's bank secrecy has enabled notorious human
rights violators such as Adolf Hitler, Ferdinand Marcos, Nicolai
Ceausescu, Mobutu Sese Seku, Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier,
and Kim Jong Il to hide their ill-gotten capital.3 4 1 "International
public opinion displays discomfort with the thought of Swiss
banks depositing and profiting from funds that are placed there by
such notorious individuals."34 2 While testifying for the U.S.
Congress in 1996, the Chairman of the World Jewish Congress
(WJC) Edgar Bronfman declared that "[n]obody should be
allowed to make a profit from the ashes of the Holocaust."3 43
Others share his sentiments, as there is an increasing awareness of
bank secrecy and the role it plays in enabling criminals and human
rights violators to prosper.3 44 "[C]rime money of all sorts finds its
way into Switzerland. Swiss banks receive money generated
through political crime, war crime, individual crime (e.g., tax
violations, insider trading, illegal laundering, and undisclosed
corporate payments) and organized crime . . . ."345 There is a

340 See Swiss Welcomed into United Nations, BBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1852461.stm.
341 See Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and InternationalHuman
Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 329-30 (1998). In the early 1980s, an exMobutu Minister revealed a list of Mobutu's estimated holdings including $143 million
in a Swiss bank. See Jonathan Kwitny, Out of Zaire: Where Mobutu's Millions Go,
NATION, May 19, 1984, at 593; see also Edward Cody, Swiss Show More Readiness to
Freeze Assets of Despots; Ceausescu and Noriega are Latest Targets, WASH. POST, Jan.
31, 1990, at Al (showing Marcos, Ceausescu, and Duvalier as leaders possibly using
Swiss bank accounts).
342 Ramasastry, supra note 341, at 329-30; see Edward Cody, Swiss Show More
Readiness to Freeze Assets of Despots-p Ceausescu and Noriega are Latest Targets,
WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1990, at Al (referring to this attitude as "an image problem"
according to Swiss officials).
343 The Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims
Before H. Comm. on Banking & Fin., 104th Cong. 27-29 (1996) [hereinafter Committee
Hearing] (statement of Edgar M. Bronfman).
344 See supra text accompanying note 330-333.
345 Pieter J. Hoets & Sara G. Zwart, Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Marcos Affair, 9
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 75, 76 (1988).
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problem with this normative approach to business, that is, should
Swiss banks make a moral judgment regarding their client before
they open an account? Should the international community
impose policing tasks on Swiss banks? Robert Studer, president
of Union Bank of Switzerland, stated that the bank did not "refuse
the money of political leaders as a matter of principle. That would
be extraordinarily unjust. But before we do business with a
political leader, it first must be approved by a member of the

executive board." 34 6
Various laws in Switzerland require banks to ascertain the
identity of their customers and refuse them if there is suspicion of
illegal activity.3 47 Starting in 1977, the Swiss Bankers Association
began to take its own measures to prevent illicit use of their banks
by adopting a "Convention of Diligence" also known as a "Know
Your Customer" Agreement.3 48 The Convention of Diligence
establishes the following: Swiss banks may not help foreigners to
"speculate against the Swiss franc" or violate foreign exchange
control regulations;3 49 banks are obligated to exercise "due
diligence" in ascertaining the true beneficiary of an account; 350
banks must request proof of the identity of the beneficial owner;
and bank chiefs must review the applications of foreign statesmen
and "turn them down at the first sign of trouble."3 5'

346 Ramasastry, supra note 341, at 344.
347 Id. at 342 (quoting Rone Tempest, Ex-Despots Can't Bank on the Swiss: The
World's Dictators are Being Put on Notice-If You're Ousted, Don't Expect Your Nest
Egg to be Waiting in Zurich or Basel, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 31, 1990, at Al).
348 See Hoets & Zwart, supra note 345, at 78-79 (1988) (citing the Agreement of
the Signatory Banks and the Swiss Bankers Association with the Swiss National Bank on
the Observance of Care by the Banks in Accepting Funds and on the Practice of Banking
Secrecy of July 1, 1977). The Diligence Agreement originally had a five-year term and
has since been renewed. See, e.g., Bankers' Code of Conduct Agreement, Swiss Bankers
Association-Swiss National Bank, July 1, 1982, reprinted in I CoM. LAWS OF EUR. 195209 (1984). The Code was renewed and amended in 1987 and 1992. See Agreement on
the Swiss Bank's Code of Conduct with Regard to the Exercise of Due Diligence
between SBA and the Signatory Banks of July 1, 1987, reprintedin TRENDS AND FORCES
ININTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW 95-109 (William Park ed., Boston Univ., 1990).

349 Hoets & Zwart, supra note 345, at 79.
350
351

Id.
See David Lawday, Psst-Swiss Accounts are no Secret, U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REP., July 4, 1988, at 47. ("Absconding with national funds is a crime under Swiss law,"
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In 1990, Switzerland added Article 305 to its Penal Code, and
under this provision, "[a]ny person who professionally accepts,
keeps on deposit, manages, or transfers assets belonging to a third
party, and fails to establish with all due diligence the identity of
the beneficial owner, shall be punished by imprisonment up to one
year, detention, or fine."35 2 Thus, bankers have a "duty" to
ascertain the customer's identity.53 In 1992, Switzerland passed
another law that prohibited banks from opening anonymous
accounts, requiring bank management to check and keep that
information confidential.3 54
Switzerland has a mixed record in cooperating in political
cases.
For example, when Ethiopia's Haile Selassie was
dethroned in 1974, Switzerland did not open his account to the
new Ethiopian government.3 55 Similarly, Switzerland "declined a
request by the [new] Iranian government to freeze the funds of the
[former] Shah" of Iran.3 56 One of the most infamous incidents of
Swiss secret banking industry involves the Nazis and Holocaust
survivors. True to its neutrality claim, Swiss banks accepted
deposits both from the Nazis and the Jewish community.3 57 In
May 1997, the United States released the Eizenstat Report, which
suggested that Swiss banks had enabled the Nazis to "prolong
[their] war effort" by moving their "gold and other [financial]

paving the way for foreign countries to seek assistance in freezing assets of deposed
dictators.); see also Ellen Wallace, Swiss Banks: Private or Secret?, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1986, at 1.
352 Franco Taisch, Swiss Statutes Concerning Money Laundering, 26 INT'L L. 695,
695 & n.3 (1992) (citing Taisch's translation of Swiss Penal Code provision).
353 See id. (leading to this conclusion).
354 See Nicolas Pidrard & Nicolas Killen, Regional Developments: Switzerland, 26
INT'L LAW. 545, 551 (1992) (discussing the regulation passed by the Swiss Federal
Banking Commission on April 25, 1991, which stated that banks could no longer rely on
Form B when opening bank accounts on a fiduciary basis).
355 See John Tagliabue, The Swiss Stop Keeping Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1986,
at F4 (describing this event).
356 Rone Tempest, Ex-Despots Can't Bank on the Swiss, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1990,
at Al.
357 Committee Hearing, supra note 343 (statement of Hon. Stuart E. Eizenstat,
Under Secretary of Commerce and U.S. Special Envoy for Property Claims of Nazi
Victims) (providing a report of efforts to retrieve and disburse Nazi gold and other assets
to the proper owners).
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assets" out of Germany.35 ' The heirs of Holocaust victims are still
searching for dormant accounts and property that was confiscated
from the Jews by the Nazis, and is allegedly hidden in Swiss
banks.35 9
According to the Eizenstat Report,
Switzerland's "business as usual" attitude persisted in the
postwar negotiations ... [T]he Swiss team were obdurate
negotiators, using legalistic positions to defend their every
interest, regardless of the moral issues also at stake. Initially, for
instance, they opposed returning any Nazi gold to those from
whom it was stolen, and they denied having received any looted
gold.36 0
Furthermore, immediately after WWII, surviving family members
had a difficult time accessing the accounts because the Swiss
Bankers Association had established rules to identify accounts that
made it very difficult for the surviving family members to file a
claim.36 ' Swiss banks would require heirs of Holocaust victims to
provide a death certificate, identify the location of the assets, and
demonstrate the right to inheritance.3 62
Perhaps one of the most self-serving agreements that
Switzerland entered in relation to Holocaust victims is the June 25,

358

WILLIAM Z. SLANY, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO

RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY

iii (1997) [hereinafter EIZENSTAT REPORT]
(study coordinated by Stuart Eizenstat, Under Sec'y of Commerce for Int'l Trade and
Special Envoy of the Dep't of State on Property Restitution in Central and Eastern
Europe).
359 See Ramasastry, supra note 341, at 350-52 (describing the lawsuits brought
against Swiss banks in 1997 and subsequent efforts in to recover and return assets of
Nazi victims stored in Swiss banks).
360 EIZENSTAT REPORT, supranote 358, at vii.
361 See id. at viii ("Over the years, the inflexibility of the Swiss Bankers'
Association and other Swiss banks made it extremely difficult for surviving family
members of Nazi victims to successfully file claims to secure bank records and other
assets.").
362 See Committee Hearing,supra note 343, at 357-60 (report of Peter Hug & Mark
Perrenoud, Assets in Switzerland of Victims of Nazism and the Compensation
Agreements with East Bloc Countries, Jan. 17, 1997) (describing two cases in which
claimants possessing death certificates and inheritance documents, respectively,
struggled to reclaim assets seized by Nazis during WWII).
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1949 Swiss-Polish agreement.3 63 This agreement allowed Poland
to acquire assets of Polish citizens without heirs; the assets would
in turn be used to compensate Swiss citizens who had
expropriation claims against Poland."* Through this agreement
Switzerland was able to receive 480,000 Swiss francs. 6 ' The
Jewish community expressed disappointment at the willingness of
the Swiss to locate dormant accounts of Polish Holocaust victims
but not those of Holocaust victims from other countries.3 66
The Swiss claim that dealing both with Germans and the
Allied Forces before and during WWII was a survival strategy to
proclaim neutrality and avoid invasion.3 67 Switzerland established
the Task Force on the Assets of Nazi Victims, charged with
investigating the "role and responsibilities of the Swiss authorities
before, during, and after WWII."3 6 8 This task force led an
investigation into the dormant account matter, and has coordinated
its efforts with the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons
(ICEP), which conducted a wide-scale audit of Swiss bank
records. 369 The scope of ICEP is limited to identifying dormant

363 See EIZENSTAT REPORT, supra note 358, at viii (describing Switzerland's two
agreements with Poland, including an agreement in which "Switzerland agreed to
transfer funds in heirless bank accounts from Polish Holocaust survivors and other Polish
nationals to the then-Communist government of Poland," which was coupled with an
agreement in which Poland would "satisfy the claims of Swiss businesses for properties
expropriated after the War").
364 Id. at 200.
365 Id.
366 See Ramasastry, supra note 341, at 357 (noting that the Jewish community was
"outraged" at the announcement of the Swiss-Polish agreement to return assets of Polish
origin held in Switzerland).
367 See Responses to the Eizenstat Report, Swiss REV. WORLD AFF., June 2, 1997,
at 28 (noting the Eizenstat Report's treatment of the Swiss neutrality policy); see also
Hugo Butler, Switzerland's Past Under the Magnifying Glass, Swiss REV. WORLD AFF.,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 6 (arguing that the intensity of the debate about Switzerland's role in
WWII can be fully comprehended only in light of Switzerland's neutrality).
368 Committee Hearing,supra note 343, at 32 (statement of the Swiss Ambassador
Thomas Borer, Head of the Swiss Task Force on the Assets of Nazi Victims).
369 See id. at 34 (noting Swiss Ambassador Thomas Border's assurances that the
work of the Swiss Task Force on the Assets of Nazi Victims would "dovetail closely"
with the work of the Volker Commission and that the Task Force will keep the Volker
Commission up to date about its investigations).
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bank accounts of persecuted persons in Swiss banks.3 70 On July
23, 1997 the Association of Swiss Bankers publicly identified the
names of almost 2000 WWII-era dormant accounts of non-Swiss
nationals.37 1 On October 29 of the same year, Switzerland
published a second list that included "nearly 3,700 foreign-owned
and more than 10,000 Swiss-owned dormant accounts."372 The
publication of these accountholders for dormant accounts was a
small but significant step toward lessening the iron veil of secrecy
in the Swiss banking industry.
Another interesting development in the history of Swiss bank
secrecy and international norms of ethics and human rights is the
Marcos asset litigation. In 1986, numerous Filipino residents in
the United States sued the estate of former Filipino President
Ferdinand Marcos, claiming human rights violations under his
regime.37 3 In 1995, the plaintiffs were awarded $2 billion in
judgment and tried to access over $500 million of Marcos's estate
deposited in Swiss accounts.374 Assets of President Marcos housed
in Swiss bank accounts were not accessible to the plaintiffs
because Swiss banks had frozen Marcos assets "at the request of
the Republic [of Philippines]."375 In their decisions, both the US
district court and the appellate courts recognized the banks as

370 See Committee Hearing, supra note 343, at 50 (statement of Paul Volcker,
Chairman, Independent Committee of Eminent Persons).
371 See David E. Sanger, Swiss Find More Bank Accounts From the War, and
Publish List, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1997, at Al (noting that the release of this list of
names is a significant break from typically strict Swiss banking privacy laws).
372 Alan Cowell, FurtherSwiss Bank Lists Fail to Calm Uproar,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 1997, at A8.
373 See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise ofFilartiga:Litigating Human
Rights Claims Against the Estate of FerdinandMarcos, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 65, 66 n. l
(1995) (detailing the five cases filed against Marcos in the U.S. Circuit Court for the
Ninth Circuit, the Multidistrict Litigation consolidation of these cases, and the jury
verdict against the Marcos estate in the human rights litigation).
374 See Kristina Luz, Dictators Beware: Torture Victims May Finally See Money
from the Marcos Vaults, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 13, 1995, at 48 (noting that the Hawaii District
Court granted plaintiffs access to the Marcos assets held in Credit Suisse and the Swiss
Banking Corp.).
375 See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 94 F.3d 539,
543 (9th Cir. 1996) (providing a brief history of the litigation and movement of assets as
a result of decisions at the district court level).

862

N.C. J.INT'L L. &CoM. REG.

Vol. XXXVIII

"agents" of the Marcos estate as they had played a role in
shielding his wealth.376
These two examples (Switzerland's handling of the Holocaust
dormant accounts and U.S. courts' recognition that banks are not
neutral but at times active agents of human rights offenses)
demonstrate that there is a nexus between human rights violations
and bank secrecy. In the early 1990s, the Swiss began to be more
proactive in freezing accounts of known corrupt leaders and
cooperating with the international community in recuperating
wealth from dictators."' Switzerland's proactive efforts to seize
ill-gotten assets of Ivorian leader Laurent Gbagbo,37 8 Zine alAbidine Ben Ali,3 7 9 Moammar Gadhafi,3 80 and Hosni Mubarak3 81
demonstrate that the norms of the international community are
slowly penetrating Switzerland's tight grip on bank secrecy and,
by default, its sovereignty.
3. The Use ofDomestic Courts to Implement Change in
the InternationalRealm: the UBS Deferred
ProsecutionAgreement
Although international agreements on taxation and security
curbed Switzerland's self-determination and choice of national
laws, the use of courts is perhaps the most dramatic and the more
efficient way of imposing checks and balances on the Swiss
sovereignty. The US courts have long recognized that "the Swiss

376 Ramasastry, supranote 341, at 449.
377 See id. at 348-49 (discussing the fact that Swiss banks froze the accounts of
Benazir Bhutto and her family after allegations of corruption were made against Bhutto).
378 See Haig Simonian, Swiss Freeze Ben Ali and Gbagbo Assets, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2011), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aOff7106-23e7- leO-8bbl -00144feab49a.html
(explaining that Swiss banks were ordered to freeze the assets of former Ivory Coast
President Laurent Gbagbo).
379 See id. (noting that the Swiss banks were ordered to freeze the accounts of
former Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali).
380 See Deborah Ball & Cassell Bryan-Low, Swiss Freeze Gadhafi's Assets, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703408604
576164544055339836.html.
381 Deborah Ball, Mubarak'sSwiss Assets Frozen, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 11, 2011, 8:24
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704329104576138451664628
050.html.
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interest in bank secrecy is substantial."3 82

Although the US
Supreme Court warned that "[w]e cannot have trade and
commerce

in world markets . . . exclusively

on our terms,

governed by our laws, and resolved by our courts," 8 the United
States has used the power of its own courts to amend Swiss bank
secrecy laws.3 84 In another case involving Swiss laws, the
Supreme Court wrote: "It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal
prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and
this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing
compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.""' Thus, while the
US courts have recognized the need to respect the sovereignty of
other states and their laws, they have also highlighted the fact that
sovereignty should not shield misconduct.
Like other industrialized states, the US has long dealt with
undeclared offshore banking. Under US law, any US citizen that
wishes to have accounts overseas must notify the IRS if the total
amount in such accounts exceeds $10,000.386
Both the US
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the IRS have tried for years to
hold tax-dodgers accountable.
In a 1983 report, General
Accounting Office, now called Government Accountability Office,
382 Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
1987). In denying an order to compel the production of documents and answers to
interrogatories by Banque Populaire Suisse, the court notes that "there are several
indications that the Swiss interest in bank secrecy is substantial." Id.
383 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
384 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 231,
9 (requiring UBS to
provide information about certain account holders involved in cross-border business);
see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, UBS Enters into Deferred Prosecution
Agreement (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv09136.htm
[hereinafter U.S. DOJ Press Release] (summarizing the details of the Deferred
Prosecution Agreement).
385 Socidt6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958); see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 55 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 762, 771, 2003 WL 203011, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2003) (denying a motion
to compel UBS to produce bank records from Switzerland, explaining "[a]mong other
concerns, UBS and its employees might face criminal sanctions if they were to respond
to plaintiffs' subpoena without the authorization of the Swiss court").
386

See Foreign FinancialAccounts Reporting Requirements, INTERNAL REVENUE

SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Foreign-Financial-Accounts-Reporting-Requirements
(last visited Jan. 15, 2013) (requiring reporting where "[t]he aggregate value of all
foreign financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year").
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stated that "[t]he use of tax havens has been of particular concern
to the IRS since the mid-1950's."m' In 2003, the US Senate began
an investigation into UBS's involvement in tax havens, and US
taxpayer interaction with UBS.3 " The DOJ followed up on this
investigation by pursuing a criminal investigation.'
During the
same year, the IRS completed a three-month long Offshore
Voluntary Compliance Initiative whereby US taxpayers could
voluntarily disclose their offshore payment cards or other offshore
financial arrangements and come into compliance.39 0 Many of the
accounts that were disclosed under this initiative were set up by
UBS, and therefore both the "IRS and DOJ focused on any and all
activities of UBS with American taxpayers in which American
taxpayers could be evading income tax."3 91
In April 2008, U.S. authorities arrested Bradley Birkenfeld, an
American private banker formerly employed by UBS, for
conspiring with Mario Staggl "to defraud the IRS by falsifying
IRS forms... in order to conceal from the IRS United States
income paid into Swiss bank accounts beneficially owned by
United States taxpayers."39 2 Birkenfeld pled guilty and cooperated
387

WILLIAM J. ANDERSON, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL EFFORTS TO

DEFINE AND COMBAT THE TAX HAVEN PROBLEM: STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
COMMERCE,

CONSUMER,

AND

MONETARY

AFFAIRS OF THE H. COMM. ON Gov'T

3 (1983).
388 See US. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role ofAccountants, Lawyers, and Financial
Professionals: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S.
Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 108th Cong. 1-10, 40 (2003) (describing UBS's involvement in
providing tax shelters for its account holders).
389 See generally Lovejoy, supra note 272, at 439 (describing the lead up to the
investigation into UBS in 2004, which led to the eventual arrest and indictment of
Bradley Birkenfeld).
390 See Early Data Show Strong Response to Offshore Initiative; Applicants Owe
OPERATIONS

Millions, Reveal Scores of Promoters, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (May 1, 2003),

http://www.irs.gov/uac/Early-Data-Show-Strong-Response-to-Offshore-Initiative;Applicants-Owe-Millions,-Reveal-Scores-of-Promoters ("Applicants to [the Offshore
Voluntary Compliance Initiative] had to provide full details on the person or persons
who promoted the offshore arrangements. Eligible taxpayers could avoid criminal
prosecution and certain penalties but would still have to pay back taxes, interest and
some penalties.").
391 Lovejoy, supra note 272, at 439.
392 Indictment of Bradley Birkenfeld & Mario Staggl, T 6 (S.D.Fla. 2008) (No.
0:08-cr-60099-WJZ).
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with the government.3 93 He admitted that he was a director in the
private division of UBS between 2001 and 2006, and he traveled
to the United States to help wealthy Americans conceal their assets
from the IRS.394 He also provided evidence that he and other
managers at UBS assisted US clients in "concealing their assets
held offshore" by creating nominee and sham entities. 39 5 By doing
so, the bank earned approximately $200 million a year.3 96 On July
1, 2008, based on Birkenfeld's information, the DOJ obtained an
order from the U.. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida to serve a John Doe summons on UBS. 397 The summons
required that UBS provide information regarding US taxpayers
who used UBS services to evade US taxes.3 98 In a certain way,
UBS brought this turn of events upon itself. Birkenfeld admitted
that he had smuggled diamonds in toothpaste tubes, deliberately
destroyed account records of UBS clients overseas, and helped US
citizens to hide ownership of their assets by creating fake offshore
trusts using false and misleading documentation.39 9
This long effort to crack down on tax-dodging schemes
culminated with the UBS signing a Deferred Prosecution
Agreement on February 18, 2009.400 In compliance with this
agreement, the Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority
(FINMA) ordered UBS to immediately provide US authorities
393 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Banker Pleads Guilty to Helping American
Real Estate Developer Evade Income Tax on $200 Million (June 19, 2008), availableat
http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv08550.htm.
394

Id.

395 Id.
396 Id
397 Order Responding to Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve John Doe Summons,
In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does (S.D.Fla. 2008) (No. 1:08-mc-21864JAL) [hereinafter John Doe Summons Order]; see also PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND Gov'T AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG.,

STAFF REPORT: TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 3 (Comm. Print 2008)

(stating the same).
398 See John Doe Summons Order, supra note 397 (noting that the IRS may serve
the John Doe summons ordering UBS to turn over certain information about its
accountholders).
399 Nick Mathiason, Tax Scandal Leaves Swiss Giant Reeling, GUARDIAN (June 28,

2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jun/29/ubs.banking.
400 See U.S. DOJ Press Release, supra note 384.
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with the identities of and account information for American
customers of UBS's cross-border business. 401
Under the
Agreement, the bank would "expeditiously exit the business of
providing banking services to United States clients with
undeclared accounts."4 02 UBS would disclose the identities of
approximately 250 customers of UBS's cross-border business and
pay a fine of $780 million.40 3 On February 19, 2009, the DOJ filed
a civil lawsuit against UBS to enforce an IRS summons from July
1, 2008, which would force the bank to disclose the names of "as
many as 52,000" US clients. 4 04 However, according to the
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, UBS was permitted to challenge
the July 1, 2008, IRS summons. 4 0 5
Given this legal showdown, UBS and the United States
reached an agreement whereby UBS would provide information
for about 4,450 account holders. 4 06 The agreement had to be
approved by the Swiss lawmakers because such disclosure was
against Switzerland's long tradition of bank secrecy.4 07 In March
2009, UBS paid the United States $788 million in fines and
handed over the details of 250 accounts of its customers to US
See id. (noting that UBS complied with the request for information).
Id.
403 Id.; David Voreacos & Carlyn Kolker, U.S. Sues UBS Seeking Swiss Account
Customer Names (Update4), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=axZmpp36bOA.
404 U.S. Steps up Pressure on UBS in Bank Secrets Case, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb.
18, 2009), http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/ 103971 #.UHsYhY4 1GFc.
405 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 231, T 13 ("The United
401

402

States . . . shall not deem UBS's . . . exhausting of all available appellate remedies

relative to the enforcement of this summons to be a violation or breach of any provision
of this Agreement.").
406 See Sven Egenter, UBS not to pay fine in U.S. tax settlement: reports, REUTERS
(Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/02/us-ubs-idUSTRE5710
1320090802 (noting that negotiations over a final agreement between UBS and the US
government are ongoing); see also Ryan J. Donmoyer, UBS Customers May Have 'Mere
Hours' to Report to IRS, BLOOMBERG (June 17, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-06-17/americans-may-have-mere-hours-to-report-ubs-accounts-to-irs-afteraccord.html (noting that UBS had to disclose the names of 4450 clients following an
agreement between the US government and the bank).
407 See Donmoyer, supra note 406 (noting that the Swiss parliament had to approve
the UBS deal with the U.S. before the names of any customers of Swiss banks were
disclosed to the U.S.).
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investigators. 0 8
Although the United States had threatened
criminal prosecution against the bank itself, in the end the case
was solved through agreements with both the bank and the Swiss
government.4 09
Arguably, the legal debate between the US authorities and
Swiss banks built up for some time prior to the lawsuit. 4 10 In the
early 1990s Switzerland had to comply with international money
laundering laws that exposed notorious dictators and criminals. 4 1 1
Now, however, the agreement between the United States and
Switzerland reaches beyond standard tax haven arrangements. In
the past, Switzerland only shared client information with
international law enforcement agencies if they were investigating a
criminal act under Swiss law. 4 12 Under the new US-Swiss
agreement, which followed the UBS settlement, Switzerland has
not changed its laws, but has agreed to reinterpret existing
legislation on "tax fraud and the like."413 The Swiss have re408 Nick Mathiason, US Tax Investigators Win Fight to Force UBS to Disclose
Accounts

Worth $18bn, GUARDIAN

(Aug.

19,

2009),

http://www.guardian.co.uk/

business/2009/aug/ I9/tax-avoidance-ubs-us-economy.
409 See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 231; see also Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on the Request for
Information from the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of America
Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Established Under the Laws of the Swiss
Confederation, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 19, 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/
tax/txdv09 USSwissAgreement%20 Decl_Signed.pdf.
410 See supra notes 271-306 and accompanying text (documenting United States
efforts via agreements since the 1950s to achieve "information exchange" with
Switzerland and the frustration of some of these efforts).
411 See Alan Riding, New Rule Reduces Swiss Banking Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, May
6, 1991, at DI (discussing the abolishment of Form B which allowed certain Swiss bank
account holders to hide their identities).
412

BUNDESGESETZ HBER INTERNATIONALE RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFSACHEN [GENERAL

FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS]

[hereinafter

IMAC], 1981 SR 351.1; Lol FEDERALE SUR L'ENTRAIDE INTERNATIONALE EN MATIlRE
PENALE [LB] [FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL

MATTERS], Mar. 20, 1981, RECUEIL SYSTEMATIQUE DU DROIT FEDERAL [RS] 351.1, art. 6

(Switz.).
413 See Eric M. Victorson, United States v. UBS AG: Has the United States
Successfully Crackedthe Vault to Swiss Banking Secrecy, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 815, 833-34, 838 (2011) (noting that the parties to the agreement "agreed to clarify
and liberalize the standards upon which information can be shared to combat tax
crimes.").
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assessed what is "tax evasion," which would allow UBS to give
account information to the Swiss Financial Tax Administration,
who will then release it to the IRS.414 By giving the Swiss
authorities the first chance to review these accounts, the new
agreement does not technically break Swiss laws on banking.4 15
The September 2009 agreement is based on the 1996 bilateral
agreement on tax evasion.4 16 This most recent amendment to the
treaty will have profound consequences not just for UBS but also
for all other Swiss banks that serve US customers. By using the
power of its domestic legal system, the United States was able
make Swiss banking polices more transparent for IRS review.
VI. Changes in Swiss Banking Laws: the Result of Pressures
within or from the Outside? Is There a Form of Checks
and Balances in the International System of States?
The changes in Swiss banking laws are the result of a
combination of domestic and international forces. Perhaps the
interaction between the international community, Switzerland, and
UBS is better explained through the lenses of post-rationalist
global political economy.4 17 While classical political economy is
based on a "rationalist epistemology" where states and firms are
"assumed to be rational, calculating 'actors,' with clear-usually
utility maximizing-preferences," post-rationalist global economy
maintains that the world is not governed by "iron laws" and
universally accepted norms. 4 18 Post-rationalist political economy
414 See id. at 834 ("[T]he Double Taxation Amendment broadens the types of cases
eligible for information sharing assistance from the competent governmental authorities
to include cases of tax fraud and tax evasion.").
415 See id ("Because treaties supersede domestic statutes in Switzerland, the
provisions in the Double Taxation Amendment calling for information sharing trump
Swiss banking secrecy laws.").
416 See id at 830, 833 (discussing the original 1996 Double Taxation Treaty and the
update to that treaty in 2009 following the U.S. government's settlement with UBS).
417 See generally RONEN PALAN ET AL., GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY:
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES 15 (Ronen Palan ed., 2000) [hereinafter PALAN ET AL.,
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY] ("Post-rationalism consists of sets of theories that explain
order-and disorder-as the product of institutional and historical continuity, formal and
informal rules of conduct, social and institutional interaction, common pathologies,
consciousness and language, conflict and contest, and so on.").
418 Id
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"adopts an open-ended historical narrative in which outcomes are
not predictable, but negotiated and consented, with each actornetwork perpetually frightened of loss or stasis."4 19
In the case of Switzerland, both the relationship between the
state and the banks, and the relationship of the state with the
international community is better understood as an evolutionary
process, viewed through a historical analysis.4 20 A strictly
utilitarian, profit and power maximizing model does not explain
the nuances of state behavior in the contemporary international
system of states. 421 The changes in Swiss banking laws were not
the result of an amalgamation of forces between the United States
and the European financial hegemony against the Swiss state.422
Neither was Switzerland eager to modify its laws to conform to
international standards. 423 Rather this was a political, historical,
and judicial process with multiple actors often acting with limited
information and, at times, against their long-term interest.4 24
Through a historical review of both domestic and international
laws, significant events, and socio-economic trends, this article
answers the first question, the source of the changes, by showing
that state behavior is evolutionary and dynamic. In other words,
states learn to adapt to changes in the international system.

419 Id. This theory is based on Foucault's "concept of agency." See id. Foucault
argues that "historical change" is in part the product of "collective agencies," whose
identity "emerge[s] in discourse" and "that cannot be defined as institutions or as social
classes." Id. at 15 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE

PRISON, (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1977 (1975)).
420 Id. ("[P]ost-rationalist [global political economy] adopts an open-ended
historical narrative.").
421

See generally PALAN ET AL., GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 417, at

15. ("States and multinational enterprises are viewed no longer simply as instrumentalist
advantage-maximizing institutions, but as complex organizations which exceed their
goals and functions but in non-utilitarian ways.").
422 Cf Victorson, supra note 413, at 444 (noting Switzerland's desire to improve its
"tarnished image" primarily motivating the country to enter into agreements that would
ultimately scale back Swiss banking secrecy protections).
423 See Crovitz, supra note 228 (noting that the Swiss resisted changing their
banking secrecy laws to accommodate international pressure).
424 For earlier discussion about the political, judicial, and historical processes that
contributed to Switzerland's decision to modify its banking secrecy laws, see, for
example, supra text accompanying notes 257-258, 308, 412.
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This article addresses the second question, that of the existence
of checks and balances, in its discussion of how the international
community brought about the changes in Swiss secrecy laws. The
term "checks and balances," as used here, serves to describe
control of the international system of states over individual state's
sovereignty. The use of this term needs to be distinguished from
the classical definition of checks and balances in the context of
separation of powers.425 That is, this term is not used to describe
separation of the judiciary, legislative, and administrative branches
of government and their system of checks and balances on each
other, but rather, this article borrows this phrase to describe tools
that the international system used to modify Switzerland's claim
on absolute sovereignty. 426
The international community used the power of treaties
(legislative means), international organizations (administrative
means), and courts (judicial means) to modify Switzerland's
behavior.4 27 In other words the three elements of the classical
definition of the checks and balances are not creating an
equilibrium between each other, but they are used in concert to
create an equilibrium in the international system of states.
The process of modifying state behavior as described in this
article differs and is not necessarily the product of balance of
powers in the international system of states. 428 The changes in
banking law secrecy were not strictly the result of equilibrium
between competing forces but rather an elaborate fusion of
elements from international law, domestic law and courts, and
regulatory bodies. International agreements (such as the European
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of
the Proceeds of Crime, 1993), international organizations (such as
OECD), and courts (for example, the US District Court for the

425 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (explaining the reasoning
behind this concept).
426 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the term).
427 For discussion about the specific legislative, administrative, and judicial means
used by the international community to prompt a change in Swiss banking secrecy
practices, see, for example, supra text accompanying note 402.
428 For earlier discussion about the dynamics of the balance of powers in the
international system of states, see, for example, supra text accompanying note 402.
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Southern District of Florida) acted in concert as tools for the
international system of states to rein in one state's use of
sovereignty to protect illegal activity. 4 2 9
Driven by pragmatic needs to exercise sovereign powers over
their own citizens and also employing normative considerations,
industrialized states successfully used three distinct elements of
governance to bring change in the international realm. Thus, the
international system of states uses the classic elements of checks
and balances to modify well-established notions of national selfdetermination and sovereignty. The case of Switzerland shows
that the need for tax revenue, security, and increased standards of
normative behavior in the international system persuades states to
curb their claim to absolute sovereignty. On the other hand, the
states themselves pursue their interests by reacting to the
international community and conforming to the world around
them.
VII. Conclusion
Although Switzerland was able to carefully navigate a difficult
situation between one of its major banks and US demands for
transparency,430 this is by no means the end of Swiss power to
protect foreign capital from their home countries. Tax havens
cannot be agreed away as they are the byproduct of national
sovereignty in the age of globalization.43' Pressure on tax havens
to conform to international agreements on transparency seems to
have a balloon effect, in that pressure and changes on one state
pushes businesses to seek favorable taxes and regulations

429 For additional discussion about the role of international organizations, courts,
and agreements as tools in the international system of states, see, for example, supra text
accompanying notes 258, 308, and 398.
430

See,

e.g.,

UBS

case,

SWITZ.

FED.

DEP'T

OF

JUST.

&

POLICE,

http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/content/ejpd/en/home/themen/wirtschaft/reffallubs.html (last
modified July 15, 2010) (providing a detailed timeline of Switzerland's activity in the
UBS litigation since 2009).
431 See Palan, Tax Havens, supra note 60, at 173 ("Tax havens cannot simply be
legislated away, because they are not perversions of the principle of sovereignty as much
as they are a direct outcome of the conflicting principles of national sovereignty in the
age of mobile capital.").
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elsewhere.4 32
Indeed, Switzerland will continue to be one of the more
appealing states in which to invest because it has historically been
one of the most stable economies in the world.43 3 In its
constitution, Switzerland acknowledges that one of the goals of the
Swiss banks is to create a healthy economic environment.4 34 Not
surprisingly, the Swiss financial sector currently accounts for
almost eleven percent of its GDP. 435 Although the bank secrecy
laws established after WWI have significantly contributed to
Switzerland's stable economy, Switzerland has acknowledged that
the March 2009 agreement does not mean that there will be
arbitrary exchange of information.4 36 Moreover, their tax system
is highly attractive to foreign investors. 437 The tax difference
between the United States and Switzerland is so significant that
two major tobacco companies, RJ Reynolds and Philip Morris,
moved their headquarters to Switzerland to take advantage of the
country's tax laws.438 In light of market fears both in the United

432

See PALAN, OFFSHORE WORLD, supra note 106, at 136-38 ("Fierce competition

has led simultaneously to the proliferation of tax havens, whereby jurisdictions actively
compete and emulate each other's laws.")
433 See SwitzerlandEconomic Information, EVERBANK, https://www.everbank.com/
personal/swiss-franc.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
434 See CONSITUTION FlDERALE (CST) [CoNsITruIoN], Apr. 18, 1999, RO 101, art.

94, para. 3, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/101/index.html (translated by The
Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation) ("The Confederation and the Cantons
shall abide by the principle of economic freedom. They shall safeguard the interests of
the Swiss economy as a whole and, together with the private sector, shall contribute to
the welfare and economic security of the population.").
435

Swiss CONFEDERATION FED. DEP'T OF FIN., SWITZERLAND AS A LOCATION FOR

FINANCIAL SERVICES: FIGURES 2 (Swiss CONFEDERATION FED. DEP'T OF FIN. 2011); see

also Brabec, supra note 241, at 251 (noting that "[a] staggering one-third of all crossborder private banking is managed by the Swiss financial sector").
436 See Bondi, supra note 215, at 12 ("UBS Chairman Villiger cautioned, however,
that he did not expect the agreement would lead to automatic exchanges of client data
between countries in the future.").
437 See ERNST &

YOUNG,

Swiss

ATrRACTIVENESS

SURVEY:

WHAT

FOREIGN

COMPANIES SAY 5 (2006), available at http://www.berneinvest.com/public/
downloads/200609 eyattractiveness surveye.pdf (discussing the numerous reasons
that Switzerland is an attractive option for foreign investors).
438

See MARK SHAPIRO & FRANK SCHRODER, MONEY LAUNDERING

AND TAX

HAVENS: THE HIDDEN BILLIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE REPORT, DIALOGUE ON
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States and in the EU, the Swiss Franc rose over two and a half
percent against the Euro in 2011.439 Indeed, the Swiss Franc has
seen a sharp rise against the Euro in the past four years including a
nineteen percent jump in 2010.440 In 2011, the Swiss currency
became so strong that the Swiss National Bank had to intervene to
weaken the franc.44 1 In a statement the Swiss National Bank said:
The current massive overvaluation of the Swiss franc poses an
acute threat to the Swiss economy and carries the risk of a
deflationary development. The Swiss National Bank is therefore
aiming for a substantial and sustained weakening of the Swiss
franc. With immediate effect, it will no longer tolerate a
EUR/CHF exchange rate below the minimum rate of CHF 1.20.
The SNB will enforce this minimum rate with the utmost
determination and is prepared to buy foreign currency in
unlimited quantities. 442
These events show that Switzerland has the financial strength
and infrastructure to overcome any temporary setbacks created by
the modification of its bank secrecy laws. Indeed, the Swiss are
committed to maintaining a prosperous economy and political
independence. 443 It is the Swiss banks' world-renowned reputation
of stability, confidentiality, and predictability that has been a
source of success and Switzerland has a great interest in keeping
that reputation intact.444 In the era of interdependence and
globalization, the Swiss also have an interest in distancing
15 (2003), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/
02058.pdf (stating that "both Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds shifted their international
headquarters in the mid-1990's from the United States to Switzerland to take advantage
of that country's secrecy laws").
439 Swiss Economy Grows Despite Strong Franc, BBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2012, 5:27
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-l17218461.
GLOBALIZATION

440 Id.

441 Swiss National Bank Acts to Weaken Strong Franc, BBC NEWS (Sept. 6, 2011,
12:43 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-14801324.
442 Id.
443 See, e.g., Swiss Foreign-PolicyStrategy, Swiss CONFEDERATION FED. DEP'T OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/

media/single.html?id=43616 (discussing Switzerland's interests as "the independence,
the prosperity, and the security of the country").
444 See Brabec, supra note 241, at 231 (noting Switzerland's reputation for
maintaining a "highly-secure banking system that is trusted worldwide").

874

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

Vol. XXXVIII

themselves from any association with criminals, terrorists, and
dictators. 445 Their "risk-averse" banking system and "fiscally
conservative" policies yield enormous investments and profits,
thus Swiss banks do not have the need to be involved with money
laundering activities or create tax havens in order to prosper.4 46
Even though complying with U.S. demands and exposing the
names of 4450 clients shook market confidence and caused UBS
to lose $17 billion in 2008, this is a short-term loss and a longterm benefit.44 7 By entering into international agreements and
modifying its internal policies, Switzerland has been able to
continue doing successful business with the international
community without the constant legal friction over tax evasion and
criminal activity.
As a last remark, it is important to note that any serious
attempt to eradicate tax havens would have to involve all major
international actors, with dire consequences for the doctrine of
state sovereignty. The abolition of tax havens would involve the
cooperation of all industrialized nations and, if successful, it
would effectively end the Westphalian system of states. While the
prospect of more transparency and proper taxation is appealing,
severely diminishing state sovereignty and curtailing the
Westphalian system of states would have unintended and perhaps
unwanted consequences.

445 See generally id. (discussing the relationship of crimes to "bank secrecy").
446 Helena Bachman, The Swiss Question Their Once ProudBanks, TIME, 3 (Mar.

5,
2009),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,18 83255,00.html
(characterizing the Swiss as "fiscally conservative" and "risk-averse"); see also Brabec,
supra note 241, at 246 (describing the measures taken by Swiss banks to limit the use of
their banks by those individuals alleged to be involved in illegal activity).
447 See Nelson D. Schwartz, For Swiss Banks, an Uncomfortable Spotlight, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at BI (noting the confidence of the chief executive of the Swiss
Bankers Association that Switzerland will continue to "retain its position as a global
wealth haven" despite having to turn over certain records to the United States).

